RAPHAEL DAMACIOUS Vs. TERESA RAPHAEL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A decree for dissolution of the marriage between the applicant and respondent No. 1 has been forwarded to this Court by the District Judge, Dumka for confirmation in accordance with the provisions of Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').

(2.) In appears that the applicant filed an application under Section 10 of the Act levelling a charge of adultery against his wife, respondent No. 1, and sought a decree for divorce on that ground. I, may be mentioned that Under section 10 any husband may present a petition to the District Court or to the High Court, paying that his marriage may be dissolved on the ground that his wife has been guilty of adultery. The claim made on behalf of the applicant was contested by respondent no. 1 who refuted the allegation that she was guilty of adultery. The learned District Judge, on consideration of the materials on record, cams to the conclusion that the applicant has been able to prove that respondent No. 1 was freely mixing with respondent no. 2, Brother Birendra Prasad, and; on the basis of the materials, finding has been recorded in favour of the applicant.

(3.) The learned Counsel appearing for the applicant and respondent No. 1, the wife, at the outset, informed the Court that, after the decree for divorce was passed by the District Judge, at the intervention of the two sons of the applicant, the difference between the applicant and respondent No. 1 has been settled and they have started living together as husband and wife. It was pointed out that as there is no provision under the Act enabling this Court, while considering the question of confirmation of the decree for divorce, to set aside the decree on the ground that later the parties have entitled into settlement or have come to understanding, the question of confirmation of the decree for divorce has to be considered on merit. Normally, in View of the subsequent development, we would have disposed of this application on that ground alone but, in absence of any provision, we have to examine the judgment of the learned District Judge, on merit.