MOHAMMAD JABIR Vs. NARAIN PRASAD DARUKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal is brought on behalf of the decree-holders against an order of the Additional District Judge of Muzaffarpur, dated 6th November, 1956, holding that the execution of the final decree for mesne profits was barred by limitation.

(2.) It appears that the final decree for mesne profits was made in Title Suit No. 208 of 1939 on the 5th June, 1951, in the following terms:

(3.) In support of this appeal the contention put forward by learned Counsel for the appellants is that the view taken by the lower appellate court is wrong and the starting point of limitation is the date of the amendment, namely, the 31st March, 1954, and the execution case was not barred by limitation. It was also pointed out on behalf of the appellants that the amendment of the decree was made within three years from the date of the decree of mesne profits, namely, from the 5th June, 1951. In our opinion the contention put forward on behalf of the appellants is well founded and must be accepted as correct. Article 182 of the Indian Limitation Act provides a period of three years as the period of limitation for the execution of a decree from the date of the amendment of the decree "where the decree has been amended.'' It was submitted by learned Counsel on behalf of the respondents that the original decree dated 5th June, 1951, did not require amendment because it finally determined the rights of the parties and the amendment made on the 31st March, 1954, was not really in the nature of a substantial amendment but merely an arithmetical calculation was inserted in the decree. We are unable to accept the submission of learned Counsel as right. We do not consider that it is open to the executing court to go behind the order of amendment and to enquire whether the amendment was a substantial amendment or merely an amendment of a clerical or arithemetical nature. It is also not open to the executing court to go into the question whether the amendment was necessary or not necessary or whether the Court of the Munsif wag competent to make the amendment or not. In our opinion, the language of Article 182 must be given a strict grammatical meaning and equitable considerations are out of place. That is the view expressed by the Privy Council in Nagendra Nath Dey v. Suresh Chandra Dey, AIR 1932 PC 165 which involved an analogous question as to the construction of Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act. It was pointed out by Sir Dinshah Mullah, who pronounced the opinion of the Judicial Committee that there was no warrant for reading into the words "where there has been an appeal" any qualification either as to the parties to it and that the words meant just what they said. At page 167 of the report the following passage occurs in the judgment of the Judicial Committee: