(1.) This is an appeal by the plaintiffs whose suit was dismissed by the learned Additional Munsif of Jehanabad and which decree has been upheld by the learned Subordinate Judge of Gaya.
(2.) The facts necessary for the determination of the question of law raised in this appeal are as follows : The appellants had instituted a title suit; numbered 57 of 1937 in the name of one Ramdeo Singh, father of respondents Ncs. 2 and 3. In that suit, there was an order for costs passed by this Court in favour of Ramdeo Singh when an order of remand had been passed by this Court. That decree was executed by the appellants in the name of Ramdeo Singh, and in execution of the decree, they purchased the disputed property in the name of Ramdeo Singh and obtained delivery of possession. On the death of Ramdeo Singh. his sons applied for mutation of their names with respect to the property and in spite of the objection by the appellants, the application was allowed, and the appellants were dispossessed from the property in dispute. Hence the plaintiffs instituted the present suit. The suit was for declaration of the appellants' title to the disputed property and recovery of possession of the property with mesne profits. The substantial defences of the contesting defendants was that a suit of this nature was barred under the provisions of Section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Additional Munsif, in agreement with the contention raised by the defendant, dismissed the suit holding that Section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure was a bar to the maintainability of the suit. On appeal by the plaintiffs the learned Judge in the Court of ap- peat below has also held that the present suit was not maintainable. Hence, this appeal.
(3.) Mr. Sinha, appearing for the appellants, has contended that the fads found in this case take it outside the purview of Section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He has urged that, when a decree for money had been obtained in the name of Ramdeo Singh, the money was really owing to the plaintiffs appellants and Ramedo Singh was merely a trustee of the money for the plaintiffs. Learned Counsel has, therefore, contended that the purchase in satisfaction of such a decree in the name of Ramdeo Singh eon-verted Ramdeo Singh into a trustee for the plaintiffs appellants. According to learned Counsel, the title that has been claimed by the appellants is not based on a benami purchase but it is based on a jural relation that had existed between the appellants and Ramdeo Singh, because the plaintiffs were the real decree-holders, and their decree was satisfied by the purchase in the name of Ramdeo Singh. In short, the argument of learned Counsel for the appellants comes to this that the plaintiffs were the real decree-holders, and as their decree was satisfied by the purchase of the disputed property they are entitled to the property.