(1.) IN M. J.C. No. 348 of 1958, the petitioner is a limited company incorporated under the INdian Companies Act and carrying on agricultural operations for the cultivation and production of sugarcane, wheat, paddy and other crops. By a notification No. III/DI-1001/57-13354, dated 29 July 1957, the Government of Bihar referred a dispute between the petitioner and the workmen under Section 10(1) of the INdustrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act 14 of 1947), for the adjudication of the industrial tribunal at Patna. The proceeding before the tribunal was numbered as Reference Case No. 17 of 1957. On 7 September 1957, opposite parties 2 to 13 filed a complaint before the industrial tribunal under Section 33 of the INdustrial Disputes Act, praying for certain reliefs. This application under Section 33A was numbered as Miscellaneous Case No. 82 of 1957, and the industrial tribunal, Bihar, after having registered the application, issued a notice to the petitioner to show cause why the reliefs prayed for by the workmen should not be granted. The petitioner showed cause before the industrial tribunal and contended that the reference itself, namely, Reference Case No. 17 of 1957, was ultra vires and illegal and that the tribunal had also no jurisdiction to act under Section 33A of the INdustrial Disputes Act. The contention of the petitioner was that the petitioner was carrying on agricultural operations and the term "industrial disputes" in Act 14 of 1947 does not cover dispute between the employer and workmen in agriculture. The argument was rejected by the industrial tribunal which held that the State Government had the Jurisdiction to make a reference of the dispute under Section 10(1) of the INdustrial Disputes Act. The argument of the petitioner is that the decision of the industrial tribunal is erroneous and a writ may be granted under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification of the State Government dated 29 July 1957, under Section 10(1) of the INdustrial Disputes Act and also for quashing the proceeding in Reference Case No. 17 of 1957 and also Miscellaneous Case No. 82 of 1957 under Section 33A of the INdustrial Disputes Act.
(2.) CAUSE has been shown by the State of Bihar and other opposite parties to whom notice of the rule was ordered to be given.
(3.) ON behalf of the petitioner learned Counsel addressed the argument that the sole occupation of the petitioner was cultivation and production of rice, wheat, sugarcane and other crops and it cannot, therefore, be said that the petitioner was engaged in any business, trade or manufacture, nor can it be said that any of the employees was so engaged. Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act defines an industry to mean any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. The definition is wide and comprehensive and it is not shown on behalf of the petitioner that there is anything in the context of the Act for cutting down the plain and natural meaning of the language of the definition. In the popular and non-technical sense an industry means an undertaking where capital and labour co-operate with each other for the purpose of producing wealth in the shape of goods, machines, tools, etc., and for making profits. Normally speaking, there must be investment of capital, there must be relationship of employer and employee and there must be the motive of profit-making. But it is not essential that all these elements should be present for the application of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act (Act 14 of 1947). It was suggested on behalf of the petitioner that there was a uniform legislative practice in this regard; and if Parliament had intended to include agriculture in the definition of "industry," it should have been expressly so stated in the Act. I am unable to accept this argument as right. There is no uniform legislative practice with regard to the definition of the word "industry." Reference was made on petitioner's behalf to Sub-section (19) of Section 3 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act (Bombay Act XI of 1947) and it was pointed out that Sub-section (19) of Section 3 of that Act defined "industry" as expressly including agriculture and agricultural operations. But in the Australian Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1904, the definition is different. Section 4 of that Act defines an "industrial dispute" as meaning a dispute in relation to industrial matters...extending beyond the limits of any one State, including disputes in relation to employment upon State railways, or to employment in industries carried on by or under the control of the Commonwealth or a State; or any public authority constituted under the Commonwealth or a State but it does not include a dispute relating to employment in any agricultural, viticultural, horticultural, or dairying pursuit. The term "industry" is defined in the same Act as meaning business, trade, manufacture, undertaking, calling, service, or employment on land or water, in which persons are employed for pay, hire, advantage, or reward, excepting only persons engaged in domestic service, and persons engaged in agricultural, viticultural, horticultural, or dairying pursuits. It is, therefore, manifest that there is no uniform legislative practice in this matter and hardly any significance can be attached to the omission of the word "agriculture" in the definition of "industry" in Section 2(j) of Act 14 of 1947. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to define fully the expression "industry" or to enumerate all the characteristic elements of an industry. As observed by Higgins, J., in the Municipal Employees case 26 C.L.R. 574 at 591: