RAM KHELAWAN Vs. LAKSHMI PRASAD SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by the defendants arising out of a suit in which a declaratory decree was sought. A lady named Mt. Chandrajote Kuer, who was impleaded as defendant third-party in this action, succeeded to the estate of her son Harish Chandra as a limited owner after his death, and on 24-5-1941 she executed a mokarrari patta in favour of defendants second party, who are the appellants before us, with regard to certain bakasht lands described in Schedule 1 of the plaint. The plaintiffs as the reversionary heirs of Harish Chandra instituted this present suit for a declaration that the patta had been executed without any legal necessity and was not binding on the reversion.

(2.) The defendants second-party resisted the plaintiffs' claim on the ground that the patta had been executed for legal necessity, and they further pleaded that the plaintiffs had no right to question the patta as they were not the next reversioners. According to the allegation of these defendants the last male owner was Urvija Singh, the husband of Chandrajote Kuer, and be has left a sister's son named Ram Padarath, who would be entitled to inherit his properties after the death of the lady. The defendants further contended that according to the Mithila School of law, which governs the parties, even if Urvija had a son Harish Chandra, Chandrajote Kuer would succeed to the estate not as the mother of Harish Chandra but as the widow of Urvija, and, as such, the estate will go to the heir of Urvija after the death of the lady.

(3.) Both the Courts below have negatived the contention of the appellants that the last male owner was Urvija Singh, and they have accepted the case of the plaintiffs that Harish Chandra, the son of Urvija, who died in 1919 while he was still a minor, was the last male owner. The Courts below were of the opinion that the Mithila school of law does not differ from the Mitakshara School of law, which lays down that when a woman succeeds to the estate of her son as a limited owner the estate passes on her death to her son's heirs. The Court of first instance, however, held that the alienation was for legal necessity and hence binding on the reversion. The lower appellate Court disagreed with this finding of the Court of first instance and held that the settlement by virtue of the patta was not for legal necessity and that "the transaction was not fair and had not been entered into by the Musammat, who is a pardanashin lady, under any independent advice." The lower appellate Court, therefore, decreed the plaintiffs' claim.