(1.) THIS application has been filed for quashing the order dated 7.8.1990 passed by Deputy Collector, Sadar Purnea (respondent No.1) contained in Annexure -1 whereby application under section 48 -E of the Bihar Tenancy Act ' (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been allowed and that dated 15.3.1991 passed in appeal by District Collector, contained in An -nexure -2, whereby the aforesaid order has been upheld.
(2.) IT appears that respondent no.4 filed an application under section 48 -E of the Act claiming bataidari right in the subject of dispute. Upon making of the said application, respondent no.3 constituted a Board and referred the matter to it for decision in the matter. As the Board failed to submit its finding within a period of six months, the proceeding was withdrawn from the Board by respondent no. 3 acting under sub -section (10) of section 48 -E of the Act.
(3.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner contended that after withdrawal of the case from the Board, respondent no.3 has not taken any steps for amicable settlement between the parties, as required under sub -section (6) of section 48 -E of the Act. It has been submitted that under the aforesaid sub -section, not only the Board is required to take steps for amicable settlement, but the Collector under the Act is also required to take such step in case the matter is withdrawn from the Board. In support of his submission, learned counsel has placed reliance upon two Division Bench decisions of this Court in Rasik Lal Singh and others vs. State of Bihar and others (1979 B.L.J.R.,20) and Kamleshwari Mandal and others vs. Balgovind Thakur and others (1984 P.L.J.R., 41). In these two cases, it was laid down that even if proceeding is withdrawn by Collector under the Act, acting under sub -section (10) of section 48 -E of the Act, the authority is required to first take steps for amicable settlement, as required under sub -section (6) of section 48 -E of the Act. In the present case, no step at all has been taken for amicable settlement by respondent no.3. Therefore, in our view, the present case is squarely covered by the aforesaid two decisions of this Court.