DINESHWAR PRASAD SINGH Vs. MANORAMA DEVI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by the tenant-defendant is directed against the decree passed by the lower appellate court in a suit for eviction filed by the respondent. The appellant has been a tenant of certain premises described in the schedule to the plaint in the town of Monghyr and the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') apply to the case. The ground for eviction made out in the plaint and accepted by both the courts below is non-payment of rent for a period of more than two months. The finding of the trial Court that the defendant was a defaulter in the matter of payment of the rent was not challenged by him before the lower appellate court nor before us. The only question which has been argued in support of the second appeal, is that the suit should be dismissed for non-compliance of the service of notice terminating the tenancy as envisaged by Section 106 of the T.P. Act. The trial Court decided the issue in favour of the appellant and dismissed the suit, but on appeal the lower appellate Court reversed the finding and decreed the suit.

(2.) The plaintiff produced a certificate of posting showing that a notice as required by law had been sent to the defendant by post. The husband of the plaintiff, P.W. 2, gave oral evidence also. The court below has accepted the evidence.

(3.) Mr. Birendra Mohan Singh, learned Counsel for the appellant, has contended that no presumption arises in favour of the plaintiff in the present case inasmuch as she did not send the notice by registered post. Referring to the provisions of Section 27 of the Bihar and Orissa General Clauses Act, the Counsel argued that such a presumption could arise only in regard to registered letters. Reliance has been placed on the decision in B.L. Shrivastava v. M.M.L. Shridhar (AIR 1975 Madh Pra 21). Mr. Singh further urged that the presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, even assuming to be applicable to the case, is very weak in nature and in the facts and circumstances of the case, the lower appellate court committed an error of law in securing service of notice.