NATHO Vs. SITAL PRASAD SAHU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The defendants in an action for ejectment on the ground of default in payment of monthly rent are the appellants. They were sued against as they had failed to pay rent from Aghan to Baisakh, 1371 Fs. Arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 42/- were also claimed against them. The courts below have found that there was default, incurring liability of eviction. A notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been given to the defendants before the suit was instituted. That notice, however, was refused on the 14th of March, 1964. In that notice the plaintiff had called upon the defendants to vacate the premises within 15 days of receipt of the notice.

(2.) Learned counsel appearing for the defendant-appellants contended that the notice (exhibit 3) was invalid inasmuch as 15 clear days was not Riven to the defendants after that notice to vacate the premises. The notice (exhibit 3) was issued on the 9th March, 1964. On the 13th March, 1964, the postal peon made an endorsement that the addressee was not found. On the next day, i.e. on the 14th March, 1964, the postal peon made another endorsement saying that it had been refused by the addressee. The postman was examined as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff to prove the endorsement and the fact of refusal.

(3.) It is true that the monthly tenancy was according to Fasli calendar year and the Hth March, 1964 on which the defendants refused to receive the notice corresponded to the 16th Chait, 1371 Fs. The last day of Chait of that year corresponded to the 28th' March. 1964 as stated by the appellate Court. The trial court, however, mentioned in its judgment that the 30th Chait corresponded to the 29th March. 1964. Learned counsel conceded that if. the 29th March, 1964 was the last day of Chait, 1371 Fs. then there were 115 clear days' notice to the defendants but he argued that the appellate court's statement about the last day of Chait being the 28th March, 1964, was correct. Learned counsel, however, was unable to show that the trial court's statement of the date was wrong. Assuming that the 28th March, 1964 was the last day of Chait. 1371 Fs., there were 15 days' notice expiring with the end of the month of Chait. Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that in such cases 15 days notice expiring with the month of tenancy is required to terminate the monthly tenancy. "Ending with" indicates that the last day of the month of tenancy will be taken in computation of the period of 15 days. The date on which the notice is received or refused will also be included in computation of the 15 days' period because neither Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act nor any other provision in law has prescribed that the period of 15 days will be from the date of receipt of the notice. It is only when the word "from" is used With reference to the computation of a particular period that the date from which the computation is to begin is excluded from computation. But if the expression in such context is either "beginning with" or "ending with" then those dates are not required to be omitted from computation. Section 9 of the General Clauses Act may be referred in this connection. In the view that I have taken with reference to the provisions made under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act for the purpose of computation of the period of 15 days the date of refusal of notice (exhibit 3) by the defendants being the 16th Chait, 1371 Fs., will give 15 days' notice expiring with the 30th Chait, 1371 Fs.