BHAGWAN DAS Vs. JANAK LAL THAKUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question in issue in this appeal is whether the order of the Commissioner of Muzaffarpur evicting the appellant from occupation of a house is beyond jurisdiction and 'ultra vires.' The plaintiff alleged that he had taken lease of the house from the defendants on a rent of Rs. 18/- per month. In the year 1942-43, a portion of the house was acquired by the Government and demolished for a road widening scheme. The plaintiff advanced a sum of Rs. 1,500/- to the defendants who agreed to make some additional construction. The plaintiff agreed to pay rent at Rs. 65/- per month. A sum of Rs. 40/-per month was to be deducted monthly so that the loan would be liquidated in December, 1946. A written statement to this effect was signed by both the parties. The plaintiff asserted that as the defendants did not complete the house, he was not liable to pay enhanced rent of Rs. 65/- per month. The plaintiff sent a registered notice to the defendants, who thereupon applied to the Controller for eviction of the plaintiff from the house. The Controller, by his order dated the 26th August 1947, ordered that the plaintiff should be evicted. The plaintiff appealed before the Commissioner who affirmed the order of eviction.

(2.) Both the Munsiff and the Subordinate Judge have held that the Commissioner's order was not 'ultra vires', and cannot be challenged in this collateral proceeding.

(3.) The plaintiff has preferred this appeal. On his behalf, learned Advocate presented two arguments. In the first place, learned Advocate pointed out that, in their application the respondents asked for eviction on the grounds (1) that the plaintiff had failed to pay arrears of rent, and (2) that the house was required for their personal use. The Controller held that the respondents failed to establish ground No. 2; but, since the plaintiff had failed to pay the arrears of rent, the Controller ordered that he should be evicted. In appeal, the Commissioner held that there was no proof that the plaintiff failed to pay the arrears of rent. The Commissioner, however, decided that the plaintiff was a tenant for a term, and that he should be evicted because the term of the lease had expired. It was contended for the appellant that the Commissioner was erroneous to hold that the plaintiff was a tenant for a specific period; and that he was liable to eviction on the expiry of the lease under Section 11 (1) (b) of Act III of 1947. Assuming that this argument is correct and the Commissioner committed a mistake of law, it cannot still be contended that the Commissioner acted without jurisdiction in ordering eviction of the plaintiff. In my opinion, the Commissioner had jurisdiction to decide whether the plaintiff was a month to month tenant or if he was a tenant for a term. If he decided the question wrongly against the plaintiff, that was not a matter affecting his jurisdiction. In examining this question, it is necessary to keep in mind the distinction between 'an absolute want of jurisdiction and an irregular assumption of jurisdiction.' By jurisdiction is meant the authority which a Court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. As pointed out by West, J., in 'AMRITRAV KRISHNA v. BALKRISHNA GANESH', 11 Bom 488: "Jurisdiction consists in taking cognizance of a case involving the determination of some jural relation, in ascertaining the essential points of it, and in pronouncing upon them." Objections affecting jurisdiction must relate either to the person, the place or the character of the suit. If a Court has competence in these respects, it may exercise jurisdiction and does exercise it whether correctly or erroneously in dealing judicially with a cause placed before it. In 'MALKARIJUN v. NARHARI', 27 Ind App 216 (PC), it was held that an execution sale could not 'be treated as nullity if the Court which sold has jurisdiction to do so', even though it erroneously decided that a person who in fact did not represent the estate of the deceased judgment-debtor was such a representative. Lord Hobhouse observed: