(1.) RESPONDENT No. 6 of C.W.J.C. No. 4362 of 1990* (Sahdeo Prasad Yadav V/s. The State of Bihar and Others), the pre -emptor, has preferred this appeal in terms of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court. He is aggrieved by the judgment dated 22.4.1999, whereby the writ petition at the instance of the purchaser has been allowed, the order of the authorities under the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ceiling Act '), has been set aside, and the pre -emption application has been rejected. We shall go by the description of the parties occurring in the writ petition.
(2.) RESPONDENT No. 6 of C.W.J.C. No. 4362 of 1990 (appellant herein) had purchased Khesra No. 189, appertaining to Khata No. 32, by two registered deeds of absolute sale of 19.7.1974, one from Thakur Prasad Mandal, and the other one from Ram Narayan Mandal. He had purchased another piece of land by registered deed of absolute sale of 19.7.1974 from Sahdeo Prasad Yadav (the writ petitioner). The writ petitioner had from a different person purchased 1.19 acres of land of Khesra No. 189, appertaining to Khata No. 32, Mauja Tapka, District -Katihar, being the vended plot for the purpose of the proceedings under section 16(3) of the Ceiling Act.
(3.) WHILE assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned counsel for respondent no. 5 (the appellant herein) submits that the unmistakable position is that the land in question has been described in the sale deed as Bhit -II land, which has been so found by both the authorities under the Ceiling Act. He next submits that the finding recorded by the authorities under the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Consolidation Act ') cannot in anyway affect the proceedings under the Ceiling Act in view of the non -obstante clause incorporated in Section 3 of the Ceiling Act. He next submits that the authorities under the Ceiling Act have the powers of Civil Court to decide the issues of facts in terms of Section 33 of the Act. In view of the position that Section 43 of the Ceiling Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the finding under the Ceiling Act has become final. He next submits the finding of facts recorded by the learned appellate authority have been set aside by the learned writ court for invalid reasons. He did not prefer revision application in terms of Section 32 of the Ceiling Act, the last forum of facts. He also submits that the vendors were parties to the proceedings throughout till the stage of the writ proceedings and have chosen not to enter appearance at any stage. In any case, they are not necessary parties in view of the provisions contained in Section 16(3)(iii) of the Ceiling Act which, inter alia, provides that conveyance has to be done by the transferee. The learned appellate authority did not carry out the terms of the remand order in accordance with the direction in the order.