(1.) HEARD learned counsel for the parties who have brought to our notice that during pendency of this appeal the appellant, Muzaffarpur regional Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as "the Authority") has merged into the Corporation as the Act under which the authority was constituted was repealed and, therefore, all its rights, liabilities and obligations in pending litigation lies on the municipal Corporation and that is why the municipal Corporation is substituted as appellant in place of the Authority. The facts which have not been disputed before us as noticed by the learned single Judge are that the respondents, petitioners 9 in number, had all been appointed on daily wages between November 1, 1980 and October 1, 1985 on different dates to perform the work of road Roller Driver in the Authority. While they were continuing in service the Establishment committee of the Authority resolved that those who were working before December 31, 1985 will continue on their posts and services of persons appointed thereafter shall be terminated which resolution of the Establishment committee was approved by the Authority on january 17, 1987 and consequently order to that effect was issued on December 17, 1988. Thereafter the petitioners filed C. W. J. C. No. 3957/1992 raising grievance about non-payment of even minimum wages. While the matter was pending against that claim the services of the petitioners were terminated by notice dated October 8, 1993. Against the proposed termination with effect from november 10, 1993 and after considering the representation submitted against that, by order dated November 6, 1993 the services of the petitioners-respondents were terminated with effect from November 10, 1993 directing them to collect the retrenchment compensation from the office of the Authority. The learned single judge found the retrenchment of the petitioners to be in violation of Section 25-F (b) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") on the aforesaid undisputed facts being not in accordance with section 25-F (b) of the Act and quashed the termination order leaving it open for the respondent, appellants herein, to terminate the services of the petitioners in case it is necessary in accordance with law.
(2.) LEARNED counsel appearing for the appellants have not challenged the findings on the merit but had raised the issue that the authority is not an Industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Act so as to invite application of Section 25-F (b) of the Act.
(3.) THE aforesaid contention is noticed to be rejected in view of the decision rendered by the supreme Court by a Bench of seven Judges in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa and Others AIR 1978 SC 548 : (1978) 2 SCC 213 : 1978-I-LLJ-349, analogous cases. It is too late in the day to contend that the activity of town development carried out by the Authority is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (j)of the Act in which the Court after giving wide import to the expression 'industry' in Section 2 (j) of the Act said that at p. 404 of LLJ: