AMBIKA PRASAD Vs. RANKI TIRKEY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal has been preferred against the order dated 5.6.1995 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal cum-3rd Additional District Judge, Chaibasa, in Compensation Case No. 92 of 1990 whereby the application filed by the applicant-respondent No. 1 under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act has been allowed and the appellant has been directed to pay a sum of Rs. 25,000/- as an interim compensation.

(2.) The short point involved in this appeal is with regard to the limitation. The applicant Ranki Tirkey filed Compensation Case No. 92 of 1990 on account of the death of her husband who died in the motor vehicle accident on 2.5.1990 while he was travelling from Gua to Manoharpur. During the pendency of the claim case, a petition was filed on 22.1.1994 under Section 140 of the Act for payment of interim compensation under no fault liability. The petition has been filed definitely beyond the period of three years from the date of accident and the amendment of the Act deleting Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act has come into force on 14.11.1994 i.e. the amendment came in force when the matter was under consideration by the tribunal. A plea of limitation was taken by the appellant-opposite party i.e. the owner of the vehicle before the tribunal also but no specific plea was there.

(3.) Mr. P.K. Prasad, appearing for and on behalf of the appellant submits that when the amendment has no retrospective effect then the amendment shall take effect from the date of its promulgation i.e. 14.11.1994. His further submission is that if the petition dated 22.1.1994 filed under Section 140 of the Act would have been decided before the Amendment Act came into force then the petition would be considered as hopelessly barred by limitation and no interim compensation could be awarded in favour of the claimant-respondent. Because of no fault of the parties when the case was under adjudication before the court, the amendment came in force and as such it cannot be held that New Act of the amendment would be enforced retrospectively while adjudicating the petition when it was filed under then amended Act. In this connection, Mr. P.K. Prasad, learned Counsel for the appellant has referred two decisions of the Supreme Court, in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. and Ramesh Singh and Anr. v. Cinta Devi, and Ors. . In the first case, the amended Act of 1988 was considered. Therein the petition for claim case was filed under Section 166 of the New Act although the accident occurred when the old Act was enforced. The claim petition being filed after repeal of the Old Act and when the New Act came into force, then it was held that the condonation of delay must be governed by the New Act and not by the Old Act. Practically this ruling goes in favour of the claimant-respondent although it appears that the Apex Court considered the repealing provision of the New Act under Section 217 read with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. The other judgment of the Apex Court relates to the deposit statutorily made under Section 173 of the New Act at the time of filing of the appeal. It has been held by the Apex Court that whenever award had been passed under the Old Act and right of appeal has been accrued under the Old Act, then even after repealing by the New Act, the appellant is entitled to file appeal without depositing statutory amount under Section 173 of the Act. Another judgment has also been referred to by Mr. P.K. Prasad in M/s. Gurucharan Singh Baldev Singh v. Yashwant Singh and Ors. , wherein it was held that the application for renewal of permit under Section 58 of the Old Act was filed before the amendment came into force but renewal could be granted when the 1988 Act came in force and after considering the repealing provision, it is held that the petition filed under the Old Act would be continued to be determined under the Old Act itself when the amended Act came in the meantime. But the recent judgment of the Supreme Court which relates directly regarding compensation cases is in the case of Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya and Ors. , wherein it was held that where the claim case was filed under Section 166 of the Act when the previous Act was in force without deletion of Sub-section (3) but during its pendency, the Amendment Act came in, deleting Sub-section (3), the petition should be governed under the new provision wherein the proposition of limitation had totally been withdrawn. The object behind such amendment on withdrawal of limitation has been discussed in this case. It was also observed that supposing that no petition was filed before the Amendment Act came into force, then after the withdrawal of limitation clause, at any time, the claim petition would have been filed then anamoly would arise in a pending case after the limitation is considered under the unamended Act, then the petition would be barred by limitation while the same claimant would have waited till the amendment comes in then his petition would have been maintainable. In that analogy, it was held that when the amendment came in force and when the petition was pending for adjudication then the claim case should be decided as if no limitation was applicable under the amended Act.