(1.) Is capital crime punishable with death, a class apart by itself, and thus beyond the majestic sweep of the constitutional right to speedy public trial under Art.21 of the Constitution ? Can a broad time frame for the original trials of capital offences he indicatively spelt out by precedent ? Does the principle and ratio of Madheshwardhari Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 Pat 324 : (1986 Cri LJ 1771) (FB) extend to capital crimes as well ? These indeed are the significant issues which have yet again necessitated this reference to the Full Bench in these five connected criminal writ jurisdiction cases.
(2.) In Madheshwardhari Singh's case (supra) as a prologue thereto it was said : "This judgement is now a part of the trilogy, beginning with the Division Bench case of the State of Bihar v. Ram Daras Ahir, 1985 Cri LJ 584 : 1984 BBCJ (HC) 749, and expanded in the subsequent Full Bench decision in State of Bihar v. Maksudan Singh, AIR 1986 Pat 38 : (1985 Cri LJ 1782). It is, perhaps, illustrative of the poet's hope of 'freedom slowly broadening down from precedent to precedent'." This judgement becomes another integral part in the series of the said trilogy and hopefully may prove as the epilogue in this context.
(3.) The terra firma for the factual matrix giving rise to the issues aforesaid may he noticed briefly from Rameshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 192 of 1986). Nearly thirteen years and nine months ago on 9th April, 1973, a case under Ss.148, 149, 452, 382/307 and 34 Penal Code, and other offences under the Indian Arms Act was registered against the petitioners at Maharajganj Police Station. Subsequently the victim of the crime, Nand Kumar Singh, succumbed to his injuries and the charge under S.307 was converted to one of murder under S.302, penal Code, as well. The petitioners soon after the incident were either arrested or surrendered to police custody and after investigation the charge-sheet was submitted on the 25th of May, 1974 and the case was committed to the Court of Session on the 15th of July, 1974. Thereafter it would seem that the trial of the petitioners was stalled entirely by the default of the prosecution and, perhaps, because of its tardy pace some of the petitioners were grant bail after having suffered incarceration for more than two years. It was not till seven years after the occurrence that the case was then transferred to the Court of the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Siwan, on 3rd June, 1980 and more than two years later on 30th Sept., 1982 charges under Ss.302 and 396, Penal Code, were framed against the petitioners. The examination of witnesses commenced before the then Additional Sessions Judge, Shri B.D. Jha on 15th Oct., 1982, but on his transfer on the 11th of August, 1983 the case was transferred to the Court of the Fourth Additional Sessions Judge, Shri Ram Avtar Singh. It is not in dispute that before him over a period of two years the prosecution chose to produce only four witnesses. Thereafter it sought and secured as many as 90 adjournments for the production of other prosecution witnesses including that of the Investigating Officer. A forceful grievance has been made that because of the non-production of the Investigating Officer and the inordinate delay and adjournments secured by the prosecution the petitioners were throughout gravely prejudiced in their defence by the absence of the Senior Advocate engaged by them who inevitably could not remain present for nearly a hundred adjournments granted therefor. It was not till 7th Feb., 1985 that the Investigating Officer was examined and because of the absence of Senior Counsel a prayer had to be made that his cross-examination be deferred. However, this request was rejected by the learned Additional Sessions Judge.