(1.) The inherent quest for certainty and uniformity in the law, even in the discretionary arena of the grant or refusal of bail in substantive appeals on capital charges pending in the High Court has in essence necessitated this reference to the Full Bench.
(2.) More than four years ago the first information report against the petitioner and others was registered at Garkha Police Station, Garkha, on the 22nd July, 1982, on charges of murder and other offences. The petitioner was arrested soon thereafter and following the somewhat expeditious investigation the prosecution filed the charge sheet against the petitioner and his co-accused who were then committed to trial before the Court of Session. He was finally convicted for offences under Sections 302 read with S.34 and 333, IPC as also under S.27 of the Arms Act and was sentenced to life imprisonment on the capital charge and for two years and one year, respectively, on the minor charges though the sentences were to run concurrently. Throughout the trial, the petitioner was declined bail and remained in custody.
(3.) Criminal Appeal No. 151 of 1985 (Anurag Baitha v. State of Bihar) was then preferred by the petitioner along with his co-accused which came up for admission before the Division Bench on the 21st Feb. 1985. Whilst the two co-appellants were granted bail, the petitioner was declined the concession primarily on the ground that he was the main assailant to whom the primal role in the crime had been attributed. More than a year thereafter, whilst the petitioner was in continued incarceration, he renewed his prayer for bail primarily on the ground that his appeal could not be possibly listed for hearing and disposal for a considerable time as yet. The matter came up before a Division Bench to which my learned brother Abidi, J. was a party, which poignantly noticed the issue whether continuation in jail even after conviction could be authorised for a period too long to have any justification when the appellant is ready for hearing and the Court is primarily responsible for the delay. Noticing the two competing principles appearing to be conflicting, namely, one which is applied when the prayer for bail is refused on merits and the other has arisen on account of the long incarceration of the petitioner and the inevitable delay in the hearing of his appeal, the matter was referred to a larger Bench for laying down firm judicial guidelines to be applied in such cases. This is how the matter is before us now.