LAL BIHARI SINGH Vs. TIPAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The defendants 1st party are the petitioners, the petition being directed against the order dated the 4th of June, 1976 passed by the 1st Subordinate Judge, Chapra in partition suit No. 235 of 1969. The petitioners being aggrieved by the order of the learned Subordinate Judge directing them, who are the sons and legal representatives of Anant Singh, defendant No. 1 in the suit (now deceased), to render accounts qua receivers.

(2.) The facts are short and simple. The point of law involved is, to my mind. plain. Opposite party No. 1 instituted the aforesaid partition suit for partition of one sixth share in Schedule I property and one fourth share in Schedule IV properties. The suit was contested. During the dependence of the suit, an application for appointment of a receiver was filed. Shorn of all details, the petitioners' father Anant Singh, who as already stated was defendant No. 1 in the suit was appointed the sole receiver in respect of Schedule IV properties. The case of the petitioner's predecessor in interest was that Schedule IV properties were his self acquired properties and could not form the subject-matter of partition. By a judgment and preliminary decree dated the 4th of June, 1973 the suit was disposed of by the learned Subordinate Judge holding that Schedule IV properties were the exclusive and self acquired properties of defendant No. 1 with regard to the rest of the properties in suit a decree for partition was passed except one plot that however, is immaterial for the purpose of this case. Against the aforesaid preliminary decree the plaintiff opposite party No. 1 has preferred an appeal in this court being first appeal No. 390 of 1973. The petitioners or their predecessor-in-interest Anant Singh had not submitted accounts for some period before the suit was disposed ol The court below, even after the preliminary decree, has called upon the petitioner to render proper accounts with regard to Schedule IV properties in respect of which the plaintiff's suit has been dismissed.

(3.) Mr. Prem Lal, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that the receiver is put in possession of any property for the benefit of the party which ultimately succeeds in a suit. The petitioners, having succeeded in respect of Schedule IV properties, with which alone we are concerned, there could not be any jurisdiction in the trial court to call upon the petitioners to render any accounts. The reason advanced is that even after the rendition of accounts whatever credit or debit balance remains, it will enure to the benefit or otherwise of the petitioners themselves. The argument seems prima facie attractive. Nonetheless, as Homles said, quoted in Province and Function of Law at page 167, law is net logic, but actual life of law is experience. And. as Lord Halsbury once said "Law is not logical Science." Life of law is not logic by experience. The object and purpose of appointment of a receiver is mainly the preservation of the subject-matter of litigation pending a judicial determination of the rights of the parties thereto. But can it be ignored that a receiver is an officer or representative of the court and subject to its order his possession is the possession of the court by its receiver? Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the appointment of a receiver is for the benefit of the party ultimately succeeding in the suit. That may be so. Nonotheless, as Lord Watson pointed out in In re Prem Lal Mullick, (1895) 22 Ind App 203 : ILR 22 Cal 1011 although a receiver has been appointed to administer the estate, he is merely the officer of the court and the estate must, for all legal purposes, be regarded as being in manibus curiae: It is extravagant to suggest that the court has not simple jurisdiction without the aid of a pending process to require accounts from its own officer. The law relating to Receivers by Woodroffe, 4th Edition "page 63 expounds the proposition of law in very succinct terms:--