CHANDRADIP SINGH Vs. ADDL MEMBER BOARD OF REVENUE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the petitioners have prayed for issuance of a writ oi certiorari quashing the order dated the 27th Aug. 1974, passed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue (respondent No. 1) in a proceeding under Section 16 (3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). A copy of the impugned order has been marked as Annexure-5.

(2.) The facts are short. On the 24th April, 1970. Ragho Singh (respondent No. 5). sold the land in question to Vidyabati (respondent No. 6). The registration of the sale deed was completed on the 24th April, 1970. On the 19th June, 1970 respondent No. 6 in her turn executed two sale deeds in respect of the entire area purchased by her from respondent No. 5. half and half in favour of petitioners 1 and 2; copies whereof have been marked as Annexures 1 and 2 respectively. The sale deeds executed on the 19th June, 1970 were presented for registration on the 4th Aug. 1970, and the registration was completed on the 9th Sept. 1970. In the meantime, however, on 21-7-70 respondent No. 4 Thakur Singh, a co-sharer and adjoining raiyat, filed an application for pre-emption under Section 16 (3) of the Act without making the petitioners as parties to the proceeding. Subsequently, however, when Vidyabati (respondent No. 6) took an objection that she had already transferred the land in question to the two petitioners, they were added as parties at the instance of respondent No. 4. Admittedly, the subsequent transferees, namely, the two petitioners were also the adjoining raiyats of the land in question. The Deputy Collector, Land Reforms (respondent No. 3) heard the case in the first instance and dismissed the application for pre-emption on the ground that the petitioners were also the adjoining raiyats and that respondent No. 4 had no better claim than the petitioners (vide his order dated the 14th Sept. 1971 (Annnexure 3). Respondent No. 4 preferred an appeal against the aforesaid order before the Sub-Divisional Officer (respondent No. 2) who by his order dated the 23rd Oct. 1972 (Annexure 4) upheld the order passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector. Respondent No. 4, thereafter, filed an application in revision before the Board of Revenue and the matter came to be finally heard by the learned Additional Member, Board of Revenue (respondent No. 1) who passed the impugned order setting aside the original and appellate orders. The only ground on which respondent No. 1 allowed the application of respondent No. 4 is that the two sale deeds (Annexures 1 and 2) executed in favour of the two petitioners by respondent No. 6 seemed to be farzi in nature. These two sale deeds in favour of the two petitioners executed by respondent No 6 were not bona fide.

(3.) The only reason for recording the finding that the two sale deeds were not bona fide has been given by the Additional Member as coincidence of dates, namely, 19th June, 1970 as the date of execution, 21st July, 1970 as the date of filing of the pre-emption application and 4th Aug. 1970 as the date of presentation of the documents in the Registration Office. This coincidence of dates is said to support the allegation of respondent No. 4 that the two sale deeds in question were antedated. One further reason, if that may be called a reason at all, is that petitioner No. 1 signed the document on the date of presentation on the 4th Aug. 1970. The aforesaid finding of the Board cannot be sustained, as it is vitiated by error of law apparent on the face of the order. The coincidence of dates may at best lead to a suspicion. I may usefully point out here that the term 'farzi' has been used by respondent No. 4 loosely. What is meant to be said is that the deeds were sham and ineffective, passing no title thereunder. In other words, the impugned sale deeds were executed fraudulently and collusively. It is well settled that the charges of fraud and collusion must be proved by those who make them -- proved by established facts or inference legitimately drawn from those facts taken together as a whole. Suspicions, surmises and conjectures are not permissible to come to such a finding. Of course, it is true that every puzzling artifice or contrivance resorted to by one accused of fraud must not necessarily be completely unravelled and cleared up and made plain before a verdict can be properly found against him. If this were not so, many a clever and dexterous knave would escape. Reference in this connection may be made to the observations of Lord Atkinson in Satis Chandra Chatterji v. Kumar Satish Kantha Roy (AIR 1923 PC 73). As we have already pointed out earlier, the coincidence of dates leads to nothing further than a mere suspicion not sufficient to outweigh the reasons of the two courts below.