RAMAUTAR SAH Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Bamautar Sah is the petitioner in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 532 of 1974, while Sukan Sah is the petitioner in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 533 of 1974. In both these applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, respondent No. 4 is one Sri Deep Singh. The District Sub-Registrar, Registration Office, Sitamarhi, and the Sub-Registrar, Registration Office. Bhutahi, are respondents 2 and 3 respectively in each of the applications. The petitioners have prayed for the issuance of an appropriate writ quashing the order dated the 11th January, 1974, passed by respondent No. 2 rejecting the applications of the petitioners filed under Section 73 of the Indian Registration Act (Act XVI of 1908} (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on the ground of limitation. The facts in both the cases are identical.

(2.) On the 20th April, 1973, respondent No. 4 Deep Singh executed two sale deeds, one in favour of Ramautar Sah and the other in favour of Sukan Sah. It is said that the deeds were duly attested by the witnesses; but as it had become late they could not 'be presented for registration on that date. Subsequently, however, respondent No, 4 with some ulterior motive was not willing to present the documents for registration and admit execution. On the 8th August, 1973, the petitioners of each of these two cases filed separate applications before respondent No. 3 for compulsory registration of the documents in question. A notice thereof was sent to respondent No. 4, and, in spite of service of notice he did not appear before the Sub-Registrar. Ultimately, an order was passed by respondent No. 3 on the 11th December, 1973 refusing to register the documents on the ground that respondent No. 4 had not admitted the execution of the documents in question by his non-appearance. This order was communicated to the petitioners four days later. The petitioners thereafter claimed to have filed an application for a certified copy of the order dated the 11th December, 1973 passed by respondent No. 3. Such a copy was made" available to the petitioners a day or two later. On the 11th January, 1974, the petitioners filed applications under Section 73 of the Act before the District Sub-Registrar (respondent No. 2). On that very date, both the applications were rejected in limine as being barred by limitation counting from the date of the order, namely, 11th December, 1973. It is these orders of the District Sub-Registrar dated the 11th January, 1974 which have been impugned in the two applications.

(3.) It was argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that the District Sub-Registrar had committed an error of law in holding that the applications filed by the petitioners in the two cases were barred by limitation. Two reasons were advanced for such submission. It was contended in the first instance that the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act ought to have been taken into consideration and the time spent in obtaining the copy of the orders of respondent No. 3 ought to have been deducted in computing the requisite period of thirty days which is prescribed as the period of limitation in Section 73 of the Act, It was next submitted that respondent No. 2 had failed to appreciate that the orders passed by respondent No. 3 on the 11th December, 1973 were communicated to the petitioners four days later. The orders had not been passed in the presence of the petitioners, nor had the petitioners been given any notice or had any knowledge with regard to the date on which the order was to be passed. In such circumstances, it was contended that the period of limitation would begin to run from the date when the order was communicated to the petitioners; and, computed from that date, there could not be any question of limitation. I think there is sufficient force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned orders as contained in Annexure 2 in each of the applications suffer from an error of law.