(1.) This revision by the defendant is directed against the order dated 25-2-1977, passed in title suit No. 77 of 1974 by the Second Munsif, Bhagalpur, under Section 11-A of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act 1947 (Act III of 1947) (hereinafter to be called the Act) directing the defendant to deposit arrears of rent from June, 1974 to January, 1977 at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month by 14-3-1977 and also the current rent by the 15th of the next following month failing which the defence against ejectment would stand struck out.
(2.) The plaintiff-opposite party has filed the aforesaid suit for eviction of the defendant on the ground of personal necessity and default in payment of rent from Jan., 1974 to May, 1974. The defendant has filed a written statement contesting the suit. It appears that, thereafter, an application under Section 11-A of the Act was filed praying for issue of a direction upon the defendant to deposit all the arrears of rent from Jan, 1974 and also the current rent. A rejoinder was filed by the defendant contesting the said application on various grounds, one of them being that the Act has already expired and therefore, no order for deposit could be made under the Act. It may be stated here that the suit was filed on the 12th June, 1974. After hearing the parties the court below passed the impugned order.
(3.) Mr. Sailesh Chandra Sinha, learned counsel, appearing in support of this application contended that the Act having expired, the court had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order and therefore, the said order is liable to be set aside as without jurisdiction. It has, however, been contended by Mr. Devendra Prasad Sinha, appearing on behalf of the opposite party that in view of the second proviso to Sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977 (Act 16 of 1977) (hereinafter to be called the 'new Act') having come into force with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1976, the impugned order would be considered to have been saved and, therefore, it is a good operative order. Alternatively, learned counsel for the opposite party contended that the impugned order should be considered to be an order passed under the 'new Act'.