MATHURA PRASAD Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by the plaintiff. The marriage of his son was fixed to be performed at Bettiah on the 12th December, 1956. On the 29th October, 1956, the plaintiff made an application to the Chief Commercial Manager of the North Eastern Railway for reserving a third class bogie from Monghyr Ghat to Bettiah and back. On the 12th November, 1956, the plaintiff was asked to deposit a sum of Rs. 70/- as advance, and he was told that the carriage will be supplied, if available. Accordingly, he deposited the aforesaid amount on the 18th November, 1956. By a letter, Ext. 2/d, dated the 4th December, 1956, the plaintiff was told that: necessary instructions had already been given to all concerned with respect to the reservation of a third class bogie. Subsequently, by a telegram, a copy whereof (Ext. 3) was forwarded to the plaintiff, the Chief Opreating Superintendent directed the officers concerned for supplying a third class bogie bearing a particular number, to the plaintiff at Monghyr Ghat on the relevant date for taking the barat party to Bettiah and back. The plaintiff, accordingly, went with the barat party to Monghyr Ghat but to his utter surprise, no reserved carriage was available there and he was put to much inconvenience and loss on account of the non-availability of the reserved bogie. On the 30th January 1956, the plaintiff filed the suit claiming damages of Rs. 1,100.60. The defendant, Union of India, contested the suit on various grounds, including its liability to pay damages for its not supplying the reserved bogie. At the trial, an argument I was advanced on behalf of the defendant that, under the Coaching Tariff, the railway was not liable in case of its failure to supply a reserved bogie. The learned Munsif, however, could not be satisfied that the Coaching Tariff had any statutory force, and therefore, he decreed the suit for a part of the claim. On appeal, however, the lower appellate Court held that, under the Coaching Tariff, the railway could not give a guarantee for supply of a reserved carriage, and, as such, could not be liable to pay any damages for its failure to supply the same. It also held that the Coaching Tariff Rules are legal and have a statutory force. The suit of the plaintiff was, accordingly dismissed, except with respect to the sum of Rs. 70/- which had been deposited by the plaintiff as advance, as stated above. Hence, this second appeal by the plain-till.

(2.) Sub-rule (1) of Rule 98 of the Coaching Tariff provides for supply of reserved carriages, and Sub-rule (2) lays down that reserved compartments or carriages are not guaranteed. Rule 99 further says that the railway administrations do not guarantee reserved accommodation by any particular train and will admit no claim for compensation for inconvenience, loss or extra expenses due to such accommodation not being provided or attached to trains by which asked for. Under the above rules, therefore, the claim of the plaintiff could not be maintainable. It has, however, been urged by Mr. Prem Lall, appearing for the appellant, that these rules have no statutory force and they do not appear to have been made under any legal authority. He has, however, conceded that, if these rules are legal and valid as having been made under legal authority, he has no case to press-Mr. Bose, appearing for the defendant-respondents, has cited a Bench decision of this Court in Nanhu Lal Vithul v. Gaya Lodging House Committee in which certain other rules relating to the requirement of obtaining platform tickets made under the Coaching Tariff Rules were held to have been legally framed and to have the force of law. On the basis of this decision, Mr. Bose contended that Rules 98 and 99 of the Coaching Tariff must be held to have been legally made and to have a statutory force. There appears to be much substance in this argument. This argument gains further support from the provisions contained in Section 3, read with item 22 of Part I of the Schedule of the Commercial Documents Evidence Act of 1939 (Act XXX of 1939). Section 3 lays down that, for the purposes of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and notwithstanding anything contained therein, a Court-(a) shall presume, within the meaning of that Act in relation to document included in Part I of the Schedule, that any document purporting to be a document included in Part II of the Schedule, as the case may be, and to have been duly made by or under an appropriate authority, was so made and that the statements contained therein are accurate. Item 22 of Part I of the Schedule relates to the publication known as the Indian Railway Conference Association Coaching and Goods Tariffs. The Coaching Tariff, to which reference has been made above, is included in this item of the Schedule. The result, therefore, is that the provisions of the Coaching Tariff have to be presumed to have been duly made by or under an appropriate authority and the statements contained therein are accurate. Thus, Rules 98 and 99 of the Coaching Tariff have got statutory force; and, under the above provisions, the railway administration could not be held to be liable for any compensation on account of the non-supply of the reserved compartment. The claim of the plaintiff for damages has, therefore, rightly been dismissed by the lower appellate Court.

(3.) In the result, there is no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly, dismissed; but there will be no order as to costs.