GENERAL MANAGER CHAMPARAN SUGAR Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER INDUSTRIAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution the sole question for consideration is whether the Presiding Officer,. Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, was justified in declining to permit the Labour Officer of the petitioner company (the employer) from representing the company in the industrial dispute that was pending before him in Miscellaneous case No. 55 of 1966.

(2.) On 5-11-1966 both the employer and the labourers filed objections to the representation of the rival parties. The employer claimed the right to be represented by its Labour Officer, namely, Sri A.R. Davids. The Union objected to his representation on the ground that the Labour Officer of the company did not come within the various classes of persons enumerated in Section 36(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The labourers were represented by one Sri S.N. Sinha and his representation was objected to by the employer on the ground that he was not an office bearer of the Union concerned. This objection was ever-ruled and it was held that Sri S.N. Sinha came within the class of persons enumerated in Section 36(1) of the Act. While rejecting the claim of the Labour Officer to represent the employer, the Tribunal passed the following order: As regards the Labour Officer of the management, I think he can not act on behalf of it in this case. He is admittedly not covered by Section 36(2) of the above act. But he claims that the Section is not exhaustive. On this point the High Courts and Tribunals are not unanimous. There is conflict in their views. In my view, the Section is exhaustive. Even if it be taken that it is not so, any person other than those mentioned in Section 36 can be allowed to represent a party in exceptional circumstances for instance, if it is shown satisfactorily that no person of the clauses mentioned in the subsection of the Section are available, so on and so forth. No such thing has been shown here. I, therefore, hold that the Labour Officer of the management cannot act for the management in this case. It will now arrange to have another qualified person to act for it.

(3.) The question whether the provisions of Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act regarding representation of employers and workmen in an industrial dispute is exhaustive or not is not free from difficulty. There has been a sharp cleavage of judicial opinion on the subject. Thus in Kanpur Hosiery Workers' Union, Kanpur v. I.K. Hosiery Factory, Kanpur L.A.C. 1952 at page 1 it was held that the provisions of Sections 33(1) and (2)(corresponding to present Section 36) were exhaustive of the persons who may represent the workmen or employer before the Appellate Tribunal. The same view was taken by the Rajasthan High Court in Duduwala & Co. v. Industrial Tribunal . But in The Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court A.I.R. 1960 Mysore 44 a subtle distinction was made between representation of a party through another person on the one hand and the appearance of the party itself before the Industrial Court on the other. It was held that Section 36 was not exhaustive but only permissive and that it cannot take away the inherent right of any party to appear in person before any judicial or quasi judicial Tribunal. Where the party is an incorporated company, it cannot obviously appear in person and that human being who according to the Articles of Association of the Company was duly authorised to represent the company should be deemed to be the company itself appearing before the Industrial Court. In such a case, it was held that the provisions of Section 36(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act would not operate as a bar. This view appears to have found favour with a Division Bench of the Patna High Court. Thus in Ram Udgar Singh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, C.N. Division, Ranchi and in The Behar Journals Ltd. Patna v. H.K. Chaudhari it was held by Mahapatra and Tarkeshwar Nath, JJ. as follows: