BABU LALL SETH Vs. GOPI LAL SETH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question at issue in this appeal is whether defendant first party are mere tenants at will or whether they are monthly tenants of the house in dispute which fell exclusively to the share of the plaintiff in a private partition. Both the lower courts have held on an examination of the evidence adduced by the parties that the tenancy was a tenancy at will and that no notice to quit was necessary to be given by the plaintiff-landlord.

(2.) The argument put forward on behalf of of the appellants is that the tenancy created between the parties was a monthly tenancy and in view of the finding of the lower courts that the notice to quit was not a valid notice, the plaintiff was not entitled to be given a decree for ejectment and for damages. We do not accept his argument as correct. In the course of hearing the defendants produced the original lease exhibit A, dated the 5th of September, 1952, granted by Muni Lal Seth. This document States that the defendants may remain in the house "as long as they please." It is true that there is another clause in the document to the effect that the occupation would be on a monthly rental of Rs. 10/- but as a matter of construction it must be held that the tenancy of the appellants was a tenancy at will. That was the view taken by the Madras High Court with regard to a similar document in Karani Manicka Mudaliar v. Chinnappa Mudaliar, ILR 36 Mad 557 (A). It was pointed out in that case that a lease by which the lessees were to hold for such time as they required or wished was a tenancy at will of the lessee which in law was a tenancy at the will of the lessor also. In support of their view the learned Judges referred to Coke on Littleton, page 55 (a), and also the English law laid down in the Halsbury's Laws of England Volume 18 page 434. This view has been accepted by a Division Bench of this High Court in Ram Lal v. Mt. Bibi Zohra, AIR 1941 Pat 228 (B). At page 230 of the report Fazl All J. has quoted the following passage from Coke on Littleton:--

(3.) It was argued, however, on behalf of the appellants that the tenancy at will terminated after the plaintiffs purchased the house. In support of this preposition reference was made to Anwarali Bepari v. Jamini Lal Roy AIR 1940 Cal 89 (C). But that does not improve the case of the appellants, for it is admitted by the appellants in paragraph 3 of their written statement that the same terms and conditions continued after the plaintiff purchased the house. This means that the appellants continued to be in occupation of the disputed house under the plaintiff on the same term and conditions as mentioned in Exhibit A. It follows, therefore, that even when the plaintiff purchased the house the defendant first party remained in occupation of the house in the character of tenant at will. If that is the correct position, the lower courts were certainly right in holding that there was no necessity of a notice to quit and that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for ejectment and for damages for the occupation of the house.