PRAYAG PASI Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The only point pressed in support of this application is that the conviction of the petitioners is illegal and fit to be set aside as the offence of which they were convicted was outside the jurisdiction of the Magistrate,

(2.) The facts of the prosecution case may be briefly stated. On 15-6-56 one Manoranjan went to a public hydrant to wash his utensils. Prayag Pashi objected to his using the water of the hydrant on the ground that he was an outsider. Manoranjan did not listen. Thereupon, Prayag assaulted him with a lathi. The incident was reported to his brother Chittaranjan. The latter came and found his brother injured. He remonstrated with Prayag who tried to justify his action, Chittaranjan brought his brother to his house. Thereafter, Prayag Pasi and Prasadi Pasi came to his house, dragged Chittaranjan out of the house and assaulted him with lathis. Prayag was charged under Section 323 of the Penal Code with having voluntarily caused hurt to "Chittaranjan. Prasadi Pasi was charged under Section 325 I. P. C. with having voluntarily caused grievous hurt to Chittaranjan. They were tried by a Magistrate of the first class. He found both of them guilty. But since evidence did not disclose clearly which of the two accused was responsible for the causation of the grievous hurt, he convicted both of them, under Section 323 I. P. C. and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- each, or in default, suffer one month's rigorous imprisonment. On appeal from his decision the learned Sessions Judge, Dhanbad, affirmed the conviction and sentence of imprisonment but set aside the sentence of fine. Prasadi and Prayag have now come up in revision.

(3.) The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that under Section 62 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, the offence under Section 323, I.P.C. was exclusively triable by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case unless an order to the contrary was passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, His contention further is that when the offence under Section 325 I. P. C. was not proved the proper course for the Magistrate was to transfer the case to the bench having jurisdiction. He relied upon Section 69 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act. I am un-able to accept this argument as correct. Section 69 of the said Act provides as follows: