STATE OF BIHAR Vs. TULSHI RAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These three applications have been filed by the defendants in the three suits giving rise to these applications. The point that falls to be decided in these cases is as to whether the court-fee paid is sufficient or not.

(2.) In 1945, certain land acquisition proceedings were started for acquisition of lands in Sindri. There was a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, which was followed by one under Section 6 of the Act, and some buildings started to be constructed on these lands. In January, 1951, there was another notification under Section 6 of the Act regarding portions of the lands which had formed subject-matter of the previous acquisition and some other lands also. An award was made in each case under Sections 11 and 12 of the Land Acquisition Act. In the suit giving rise to Civil Revision No. 384, the award of the Land Acquisition Officer amounted to Rs. 474/6/-; in the suit giving rise to Civil Revision No. 385, the award was for Rs. 284/10/-; and in the suit out of which Civil Revision No. 386 arises, the award was to the extent of Rs. 1,107/13/3. Thereafter, there were applications under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for reference to the District Judge, and the plaintiffs of these suits claimed compensation for the lands and buildings existing on the lands. After that, the plaintiffs have instituted these suits giving rise to these applications, and the important reliefs sought in the plaints are the following : (a) for a declaration that the land acquisition case in question was wholly void; and (b) for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants their agents and servants from taking possession of the properties described in Schedules A and B of the plaints and from demolishing the structures in Schedule B. In each case, the- suit has been valued at the amount of the compensation awarded in the land acquisition proceeding. In the body of the plaint in each case, it is mentioned that the plaintiff had built the structures on the land before the acquisition, and the value of those buildings has been mentioned. The defendants contended before the Court below, as they contend here, that the value of the suits should be the value of the buildings and the lands mentioned in the plaints, and that the amount of the awards in the land acquisition proceedings is not the proper value of the suits. The Court below has held that the plaint in each case is properly valued and the court-fee paid is sufficient. It is against this order that the defendants have moved this Court.

(3.) Learned Government Pleader, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submits that all these three suits are governed by the provisions of Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act, and ad valorem court-fee has got to be paid. So far there is no difficulty. Mr. Government 'Pleader also submits that the plaintiff in each case must value the suit on the amount mentioned in each plaint in regard to the value of the lands including the buildings. The relevant portion of Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act is as follows : "(iv) In suits -- * * * * * (c) to obtain a declaratory decree or order, where consequential relief is prayed, * * * * * according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal **** It is established that, under the provisions of this section a plaintiff is entitled to put his own valuation, but the Court can interfere only if the valuation put by the plaintiff is an arbitrary one, and in such case the Court can put its own valuation and ask the plaintiff to pay court-fee upon that valuation. So the test in all cases covered by Section 7 (iv) (c) is whether the valuation put by the plaintiff is an. arbitrary or unreasonable one; in other words, whether the valuation put by the plaintiff can be said to have no relation to facts. In the present case, the main relief for declaration in each case is that the land acquisition proceeding is null and void, and the suit is valued at the amount of the award given in that land acquisition proceeding. The question is whether that valuation can be said to be an arbitrary valuation. In my judgment, it cannot possibly be said in these cases that the valuation put by the plaintiffs is an arbitrary. valuation because the plaintiffs refer to the awards made in the land acquisition proceedings and they have given the valuation which was the amount of the award in the particular case. Therefore, that cannot be called an arbitrary valuation; and if that is not so, the Court can't impose upon the plaintiffs a different valuation and ask the plaintiffs to pay higher court-fees. Mr. Government Pleader, however, draws attention to the case of Brij Krishna Das v. Murli Rai, 4 Pat LJ 703: (AIR 1920 Pat 656) (A). The facts of that case were that the plaintiffs had valued the relief at Rs. 3,976/-, that is, four annas share of Rs. 15,904/-, the amount of the decree. The plaintiffs did not claim any interest in the remaining twelve annas share, and for the purposes of jurisdiction, the suit was valued at Rs. 15,904/-. In these circumstances, it was held that, if there had been no sale and the decree had stood for Rs. 15,904/- that decree being a joint decree the loss to the plaintiffs would have been Rs. 15,904/-, and they would have to pay court-fee on that sum, namely, Rs. 15,904/-, but the sale having taken place, the loss to the plaintiffs was the value of their interest in the property sold, that is, the four annas share in the entire properties, the value of which, according to the plaint, was Rs. 2,20,000/-, and, therefore, the plaintiffs were bound to pay court-fee on Rs. 55,000/-. In effect, therefore, it was held that, if the decree had not been executed, the proper valuation should have been the amount for which the decree was passed and not the value of the property; but as, in pursuance of the decree, the property was sold, the plaintiffs were obliged to pay coure-fee on the value of their share in the property sold. Even if this were a good authority for the proposition that the plaintiffs should value the suits under Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act at the loss which the plaintiffs would incur, in the cases in hand, though the plaintiffs have mentioned the value of the structures on the lands, those structures are still on the land and have not been demolished, and it cannot be said that the plaintiffs have been put to loss to the extent of the value of the structures on the land. The Court-fees Act is a fiscal enactment and must be construed strictly. From the language used in the section, I have no doubt that a plaintiff is entitled to put his own valuation in suits covered by Section 7 (iv) (c) of the Act, and it is only in those cases where the valuation put by the plaintiff is arbitrary that the Courts can intervene and put their own valuation. As I have said, in the present cases, that is not the position. Mr. Government Pleader also placed reliance on the case of Kalipada Mukharjee In the matter of, AIR 1930 Cal 686 (B), but, in my opinion, that case can give us no guidance. In the case of Mt. Rupia v. Bhatu Mahton, AIR 1944 Pat 17 (FB) (C), it was held by their Lordships that, though both under Section 7 (iv) (c) and Article 1, Schedule 1, ad valorem court-fee is required to be paid, the basis of valuation is not the same. Whereas under the former provision ad valorem court-fee has to be paid on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal, under the latter provision ad valorem court-fee has to be paid on the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute; in other words, in accordance with the former provision the plaintiff can put his own valuation on the relief sought by him, whereas under the latter provision the value of the subject-matter must necessarily mean the market value. I should have thought that this proposition. as laid down by their Lordships, is not in favour of the proposition submitted by the learned Government Pleader and the view taken in that case supports the view which I have ventured to take. Their Lordships also observed that in a suit to obtain a declaratory decree with consequential relief, the Court is empowered under the law to revise the valuation put by the plaintiff and if on such revision it is of opinion that the valuation is insufficient or arbitrary, it has jurisdiction to fix a right value, exactly the view which I have already taken.