HAROON RASHID Vs. REQUEEBA KHATOON

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY order dated 25-8-1995 passed in Criminal Revision No.199 of 1994 (R), this matter was referred by the learned Single Judge to a larger Bench, on the ground that two Single Bench Judgments of this Court reported at 1987 PLJR 65 (Md. Yunus v. Bibi Phenkani alias Tasrun Nisa and another) and another reported at 1989 (2) BLJ 671 (Md. Arif v. Bibi Jamila Kltatoon) were of conflicting view regarding determination and interpretati on of Section 3 (l)(a) and Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights & Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act') and regarding period of maintenance to a divorced Muslim women. As the same question was involved in Criminal Revision No. 199 of 1994 (R), by Order dated 18-10-1995, another learned single Judge ordered that it would be heard alofagwith Criminal Revision No. 199 of 1994 (R).

(2.) CRIMINAL Revision No. 199 of 1994 (R) was filed against the order dated 31-8-1994 passed by Sri U.N. Mishra, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ranchi in Misc. Case No. 57 of 1995 by which he ordered petitioner-husband to pay maintenance allowance under Section 125 of the Code of CRIMINAL Procedure from 11-11-1985 to 10-7-1988 (date of divorce) at the rate of Rs. 400/- (rupees four hundred) per month amounting to Rs. 12,800/- and at the rate of Rs. 600/- (six hundred) per month for next three months (Iddat period) with direction that interim maintenance allowance granted earlier @ Rs. 200/- and Rs. 600/- respectively would be adjusted. The opposite party- divorced wife was also ordered to be paid Rs. 75,000/- in lumpsum for her further maintenance beyond iddat period under Section 3 of the Act. The petitioner-husband challenged the impugned order mainly on the ground that under the Act, the husband has no liability to pay maintenance to his divorced wife beyond the period of iddat, as provided under Section 3 of the Act and that the impugned order was passed without considering the fact that the opposite party-wife, had withdrawn the maintenance amount for the period of iddat period and that the impugned order was contrary to the remand order dated 12-11-1990 passed by the High Court in Cr. Misc. No. 347 of 1990 (R).

(3.) SRI P.K. Prasad, learned Advocate for the petitioner of Cr. Revision No. 199 of 1994 (R) challenged the impugned order on the date that under the Act, the liability of the husband of a divorced Muslim woman is confined to the period of Iddat and hence the direction to pay maintenance to the opposite party beyond the period of Iddat was without jurisdiction. The impugned order was also challenged on the ground that there was no basis for fixing Rs.75,000/- as lump-sum for future maintenance, especially when Rs. 8200/- deposited in Court was withdrawn by the opposite party, without protest. SRI Prasad contended that the Division Bench in Cr. Misc. No. 347 of 1990 (R) referred to above, held that till date of divorce i.e. till 10-7-1988, provision of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will apply and after that, provision of the Act will be applicable, in absence of option exercise by the husband and wife under Section 5 of the Act, opting to be governed by Section 125 or 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Anwar appearing for the opposite party divorced wife, fairly conceded that after coming into force of the Act, proceeding under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will not be applicable in view of Para 45 of the judgment of the Division Bench referred to above (Cr. Misc. No. 347 of 1990 (R). Mr. Anwar emphasised that a reasonable and fair maintenance should be made as provided under Section 3 (l)(a) of the Act and that the words used "within iddat period' signified only that the amount has to be paid within that period and it cannot mean for the iddat period. He also pointed out that the object of the Act is to protect the rights of divorced Muslim Woman and not to snatch the rights which were available to them.