SHRI UDAY BANERJEE Vs. SHRI P.R. DUTTA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A reference of this Civil Revision application to the Division Bench with regard to the true interpretation of Sec. 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (Bihar Act NO. 4 of 1983) (hereinafter referred to as the Act for the sake of brevity and convenience) has been necessitated by and is reminiscent of an old saying id perferctum est quod ex omnibus suls partious constat; et nihil perfectum est dum aliquid restal agendum; that is prefect which is complete in all its parts, and nothing is perfect whilst anything remains to be done. In this case the difficulty has arisen not from anything inherent in the subject itself which might be quite simple treated but by the loose draftsmanship which, of late, has become more frequent in view of the vast increase in the number of new legislative enactments from time to time. When this case came up before a learned single judge of this Court at the admission stage itself a preliminary objection was raised by learned counsel for the opposite party that no civil revision application could be entertained under Sec. 14(8) of the Act. This at once impels me to quote in extenso Sec. 14(8) of the Act running thus:

(2.) An example has been given by Mr. S.K. Mazumdar learned counsel for the petitioner. The submission is that if a literal and grammatical adherence is to be given to Sec. 14 (8) of the Act as contended by learned counsel for the opposite party, in the case of a partial eviction that portion of the order which is against the tenant will only be revisable and not appealable whereas assuming though not admitting, in favour of the opposite party that an appeal would lie at the instance of the landlord, then the landlord will have to seek a remedy by way of an appeal before an appellate court the forum being inferior to that of this Court What an anomalous situation ? I fail to appreciate this point since the Statute has given no right of appeal whatsoever even to a landlord. Therefore, the question of any anomaly does not arise at all.

(3.) So far I have been dealing with the question as a matter of first impression on the basis of well settled canons of construction of statutes but I am beholden to Mr. Shreenath Singh, a senior counsel of this Court who amicus curiae stood up and sought permission of the Court duly accorded to him to assist it on the point in controversy by inviting our attention to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Kumar Chowdhary v/s. Smt. Narain Devi Taneja : [(1980) 2 SCC 120] which clinches the issue in so far as the question in controversy in the instant case is concerned as a matter of judicial precedent. That was a case dealing with Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and it appears that the language of Sec. 14(8) of our Act has, for all practical purposes, been borrowed from the language of Sec. 25 -B of the Delhi Act. Sec. 25 -B of the Delhi Act corresponds to Sec. 14 of the Bihar Act with the only difference that in the Delhi Act the forum for adjudication of matters relating to eviction was prescribed to be the court of Controller whereas under the Bihar Act the forum is a civil court of competent jurisdiction . The language of section25 -B (8) of the Delhi Act has, for all practical purposes, been incorporated in Sec. 14(8) of the Bihar Act. The only difference is that in the Delhi Act the order for recovery of possession of any premises relates to orders made by the controller in accordance with the summary procedure specified in that Sec. whereas in the Bihar Act a petition has to be filed for revision in the High Court under the proviso to Sec. 14 (8) of the Act. All that has been said in the proviso to Sec. 25 -B (8) of the Delhi Act is that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this Sec. is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect there to as it thinks fit. In the Bihar Act the proviso to Sec. 14(8) speaks of an application to be made by the tenant whereas in the Delhi Act such an application is not a must be the High Court may suo motu invoke its revisional jurisdiction. Apart from subsection (8) of Sec. 25 -B of the Delhi Act practically the entire section, namely, Sec. 25 -B of the Delhi Act is for all practical purposes, repeated in Sec. 14 of the Bihar Act. Both these Ss. are, therefore, clearly in pari materia. A similar question arose in the Delhi High Court on a number of occasions and in a series of decisions the Delhi High Court took the view that revision application was maintainable against the order of the controller at the instance of the landlord also although in express terms Sec. 25 -B(8) did not say so. Ultimately in one of such cases the matter came up before the supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Chowdhary's case (supra) and it was held, having considered the matter thread bare, by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the remedy of the landlady against the order of the Controller was "by way of revision (and revision only)" of that order by the High Court as laid down in the proviso to sub -section (8) of Sec. 25B, even though it was an order not directing, but refusing, recovery of possession of the premises in dispute. So is the case here before us with the only difference that the order has been passed not by the Controller as in the Delhi Act which was the proper forum there but by a civil court of a competent jurisdiction as under our Act. Having already held that Sec. 25 B of the Delhi Act and Sec. 14 of the Bihar Act are in pari materia , I am sufficiently fortified in my view that the remedy of the landlord petitioner against the order of the Court in the present case was "by way of revision (and revision only)" of that order by the High Court as laid down in proviso to subsection (8) of Sec. 14 of the Act (Bihar Act). Thus the preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the civil revision application raised by learned counsel for the opposite party must be rejected as not tenable in law either on principle or on precedent. I am, therefore, firmly of the view that the civil revision application is maintainable at the instance of the landlord petitioner. Since this is the only point for which this case was referred to a Division Bench, it is now remitted back to the learned single Judge for entertaining the application and deciding the case for admission on its own merits in accordance with law, In the circumstances, however, I shall make no order as to costs.