MUNESHWAR PANDEY Vs. CHAIRMAN CHOTANAGPUR REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner, who is an operator of a bus service on the route Kandi-Garhwa in the district of Palamau, has by this application challenged the order as contained in Annex. '5' passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, respondent No. 3, making modifications in the timings fixed by the respondent No. 1 Regional Transport Authority for the running of his bus. Admittedly, respondent No. 4 was running a service on the route Daltonganj-Kandi from before and certain portions of the two routes are common. The permit to the petitioner was granted for a period of 5 years on the 12th October, 1971, a copy whereof is Annex. '2'. According to the provisional timing, indicated therein, the bus had to leave Garhwa at 8.10 A. M. and Kandi at 4 P. M. Subsequently, there was another change whereby the petitioner had to start his bus from Kandi at 1.55 P. M. On the 20th April, 1972, another order was passed regarding the timetable, a certified copy whereof is Annex. '3' to the writ application. The interpretation of this order is under controversy. The order states that the present petitioner Muneshwar Pandey was demanding revised timings on the ground that the effective timetable was not economical. The petitioner prayed that he should be permitted to leave Kandi at 6.50 A. M. and Garhwa 4.40 P. M. It is further mentioned in the order that it was not possible to permit the petitioner to leave at 6.50 A. M. from Kandi as there would be a clash in the timings given to other services. So far as Garhwa was concerned, it was said that the request could be allowed on provisional basis. The matter was thereafter closed by the following sentence:--

(2.) The respondent No. 4 moved the respondent No. 3 challenging the order as contained in Annex. '4'. The respondent No. 3 while referring to the order impugned before him has mentioned the date of the order as 26-11-1974. It appears 1o be an accidental slip. Actually, the order had been passed on 25-11-1974. The respondent No. 3 accepted the contention of the respondent and set aside the order dated 25-11-1974 (Annex. 4) of the Regional Transport Authority on the ground that the order as contained in Annex. '3' was a final order and, as such, could not be altered or modified by the Regional Transport Authority by Annex. '4'. The timing mentioned in Annex. '3' was accordingly restored. The petitioner has challenged the order passed by respondent No. 3 which is Annex. '5' by the present application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

(3.) The learned counsel for the petitioner appears to be right when he states that respondent No, 3 was under a misapprehension about the nature of the order passed on the 20th April, 1972, and he wrongly assumed that the order was a final one and was, therefore, not subject to any modification. Annexure '3' itself clearly mentions that the order was provisional. The quoted portion of the order shows that objections were being invited by the other interested parties before final orders could be passed in this regard. In the circumstances, there is no scope for saying that the order under Annexure '3' was not a provisional one. The learned counsel for respondent No. 4 has, in his reply, contended that the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act do not make any distinction between a provisional order and a final order so far as fixation of time is concerned and once the timings were fixed, they cannot be modified by the Regional Transport Authority. Reliance has been placed on the case of Rajput Transport Co. v. Shri Nand Kishore Prasad, (AIR 1973 Pat 373), wherein it was stated that once the timing was fixed by the Regional Transport Authority at the time of the grant of the permit it could not be altered during the currency of the period. The learned counsel stated that while making the aforesaid observation this court did not distinguish between a final order and a provisional order in this regard. The argument is that once an order is passed the same was binding on the parties during the entire period for which the permit remained operative. After having considered this argument, I am not in a position to accept it. Although the provisions in the Act do not expressly mention passing of provisional orders in this regard, it must be held that the authority concerned is empowered to make interim arrangements for the period that he is not in a position to make final order. Analogy can be given where the court passes an interim order pending an application for stay under Order 41, Rule 5 of the C. P. C. or of a case where provisional bail is granted. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts was originally created by the Constitution a question had arisen as to whether during the pendency of a writ application the Court could grant interim orders. The argument that the High Court could not grant interim orders was based upon a similar reason, namely, that the Constitution did not mention Courts' powers to pass interim orders. However, it is firmly established that, although the Constitution did not mention such a power expressly, the authority of the High Court was extended to and included the power to pass such orders. Whenever an authority is given a power to decide a particular matter, it must generally be held that pending final decision the authority has powers to make interim arrangements. In the present case, the Regional Transport Authority exercised such a power. From the order it appears that the authority somehow thought it advisable to pass final order only after hearing the other interested parties. For that purpose, it was mentioned that objections should be invited. The order made it expressly clear that the order was being passed provisionally pending receipt of objections. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the order which had been passed on the 20th of April, 1972, was a provisional one and was subject to the final orders which were to follow after consideration of the convenience of other operators. The respondent No. 3 was not right in assuming that the order dated 20-4-1972 was a final order and, therefore, could not be modified.