SANTI DEVI Vs. DEPUTY COMMR DISTRICT MAGISTRATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application to quash the order of the Deputy Commissioner (District Magistrate)of Hazaribagh, dated the 5th June, 1964, (annexure N), allotting the house of the petitioner in Giridih town to one Sri R.P. Singh, Additional Subdivisional Agriculture Officer. The order was made purporting to be in exercise of the power under Clause (a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease. Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). For the previous history of the dispute on the subject my judgments in Miscellaneous Judicial Case no. 432 of 1964 and Miscellaneous Judicial Case No 692 of 1964, which have been disposed of today, may be seen. The District Magistrate had made the allotment of the house in the name of another Magistrate Sri C. Jha, on the 17th March, 1964. Sri C. Jha occupied the house and then gave notice of his intention to vacate fee house with effect from the 10th June, 1964. (annexure M). He also forwarded a copy of his vacation notice to the petitioner by his Memo No. 1208, dated the 27th May, 1964. He thus gave 15 days notice as required bv the said statutory provisions, and the District Magistrate's order allotting the house to Sri R.P. Singh wan passed on the 5th June, 1965. The time-limit required by the said clause of the Act was substantially complied with, and as pointed out in the Full Bench decision, Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha v District Magistrate of Monghyr, 1965 B.L.J.R 876: (AIR 1966 Pat 144 (KB) ), even if there is a delay of a few days as regards the duration of the notice, that will not affect the validity of the order.

(2.) Two new points were, however, taken up in this petition. It was urged that the said provision of the Act was unconstitutional as offending Articles 14 and 31 of the Constitution. It is true that Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act is a special provision intended for the benefit of the public servants. In the aforesaid Full Bench decision the main object of the section has been explained. But merely because there is a statutory provision intended to benefit the Government servants as a class such a provision cannot be held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is well known that in the Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code and the Civil Procedure Code special provisions have been made for the benefit of the public servants, and there are several decisions of the High Courts and the Supreme Court to the effect that such provisions do not contravene Article 14 of the Constitution (see AIR 1955 S.C 41) There is reasonable nexus between the basis of the classification for the purpose of differentiation and the object sought to be achieved by the offending provision.

(3.) Similarly, reliance on Article 31 of the Constitution is quite futile. Here there is no attempt to deprive the petitioner of her right to property. Her freedom to choose any tenant she likes is taken away and the District Magistrate is authorised by law to allot the house to another public servant, subject to certain safeguards. As no property right is infringed, there is no question of violating Article 31 of the Constitution. It may be urged with some justification that there is some restriction on the right to hold property, but the restriction must be held to be reasonable for the very reasons for which I have held that the offending clause does not violate Article 14. Public servants are liable to transfer from place to place at very short notice and unless power is conferred on a competent authority to provide suitable accommodation for them the efficiency in the discharge of public duties will suffer.