UNION OF INDIA Vs. BINOD BEHARI SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner, the Union of India as owner of Eastern Railway Administration, had entered into a goods handling contract with the opposite party in December, 1957. The contract contained an arbitration clause, and certain disputes having arisen between the parties, they were referred to the arbitration of the Deputy General Manager of the Railway. In due course, the arbitrator made an award, whereby the opposite party was found to be entitled to receive from the petitioner a sum of Rs. 82,100 in full satisfaction of his dues under the contract. The award which was given on 26-2-1965 was filed in Court on 25-5-1965, and the notice contemplated by Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act was served upon the petitioner's lawyer on 28-6-1965. Within thirty days thereof, viz., on 24-7-1965, the petitioner filed an objection to the award challenging the same as vitiated on various grounds, such as misconduct, or having been made beyond the scope of the reference to arbitration. Subsequently, two applications were filed on behalf of the petitioner seeking amendment of its original objection petition dated 24-7-1965. The first amendment petition was filed on 23-9-1965, praying for the insertion of certain additional grounds of attack against the award. The second application was filed on 6-11-1965 for the insertion of some more grounds. Both the applications for amendment were opposed on behalf of the opposite party. Ultimately, after hearing the parties and considering the amendment petitions, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge rejected the amendment petitions by his order dated 27-11-1965. It is that order which is sought to be assailed by the petitioner in this civil revision application.

(2.) At this stage, it would be proper to state the precise grounds which have weighed with the learned Judge for refusing the two amendment petitions. In paragraph 3 of his order the learned Judge has observed that having gone through the amendment petitions, there can be no doubt that they raised fresh grounds of objection which were sought to be added to the grounds already mentioned in the original objection petition dated 24-7-1965. Secondly, the learned Judge referred to the provisions contained in Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and held that the objection petition filed by the petitioner on 24-7-1965 was governed by the thirty days limitation period provided by the said Article of the Limitation Act, the computation being made from the date of service of the notice of the filing of the award. Since however, both the amendment petitions have been filed beyond the period of thirty days mentioned above, the learned Judge felt that to allow the amendment petitions would be tantamount to giving the petitioner an opportunity to raise fresh grounds of objections beyond the period of limitation. The learned Judge, therefore, concluded:

(3.) So far as the applicability of Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act, 1963, is concerned, there can be no dispute, having regard to the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Seonarain Lal v. Prabhu Chand, AIR 1958 Pat 252. There, it was clearly laid down that an objection to an award which has been filed in Court in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act must be preferred within the period of thirty days prescribed by Article 158 of the Limitation Act of 1908, which was the provision corresponding to Article 119(b) of the present Limitation Act. In other words, the objection could be filed within a period of thirty days from the date of service of the notice of the filing of the award. Therefore, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge was right in holding that the two amendment petitions had been filed by the petitioner beyond the period of thirty days mentioned in Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act.