BABU LAL SAO Vs. NIWAS BAJPAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These nine petitioners have been convicted under Section 379, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months. They have also been convicted under Section 143, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. The sentences have been ordered to run concurrently.

(2.) The necessary facts for the present purposes are these: The petitioners are alleged to have gone to the land of the complainant. Sri Niwas Bajpai, covered by two plots, on 26-11-1959, with the object of culling away the standing paddy crops. It is said that they succeeded in cutting away the paddy crops of 10 kathas of land out of an area of about 3 bighas. It appears that in 1910, this land was sold in a rent decree and after purchase by some person, ultimately in 1924 the father of the complainant purchased this land from one Sudarshan Sao through a registered sale-deed. There was thereafter mutation of the name of the purchaser and complainant's father and thereafter the complainant paid rent to the landlord for this land. The complainant by virtue of title claimed to be in possession ail along and alleged that the paddy crop standing on the land had been grown by him. The ease of the accused, on the other hand, was amongst other, that half of the two plots was purchased from one Kamal Krishna Tewari who had title to this land and the title of the complainant was denied. The trial court has held that the land in question was in possession of the complainant and that he had raised the paddy crops and the accused persons forming an unlawful assembly had cut away the paddy crops on 10 kathas of land and had thus committed an offence punishable under Sections 143 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. This finding has been affirmed by the lower appellate Court.

(3.) Appearing on behalf of the petitioners Mr. J.K. Prasad has argued that there is no finding of dishonest intention by the courts below. Learned Counsel's submission is that the courts below should have considered the petitioner's' claim that they were acting in exercise of bona fide belief that they had title and possession over the land. There is no disagreement with this view of the law on behalf of the State. It is, therefore, unnecessary to deal with some decisions upon which learned counsel for the petitioners has relied. Learned Standing Counsel contends that essential condition is that there must be an assertion of claim of such right. If such a claim were put forward, it was the duly of the courts below to examine this mailer and give necessary finding. But no such claim appears to have been put forward. Mr. J.K. Prasad has contended that the trend of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses would show that such a claim was put forward. In order to appreciate his contention, I have looked into the written statement filed on behalf of the accused persons as also the statements of the accused persons recorded under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It appears from both these documents that the clear case of the accused persons was the denial of the occurrence and they have not asserted any claim much less a bona fide claim over the land in question.