LAWS(PAT)-1966-7-15

HINDUSTHAN GENERAL INSURANCE SOCIETY LTD. Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, LABOUR COURT, DHANBAD AND OTHERS

Decided On July 27, 1966
HINDUSTHAN GENERAL INSURANCE SOCIETY LTD. Appellant
V/S
Presiding Officer, Central Government, Labour Court, Dhanbad And Others Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These two applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India are for quashing the order dated 20.2.1964 passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Labour Court, Dhanbad, in Applications Nos. LC. 17 and 18 of 1963. Nirmal Chandra Dey, Respondent no. 2 in M.J.C. 999 of 1964, was the applicant in LC 17 of 1963 while Asrafi Lal, Respondent no. 2 in M.J.C. 999 of 1964 was the applicant in LC 18 of 1963 Both these respondents are employees under the present petitioners, i.e. Hindusthan General Insurance Society Ltd. in their office in Calcutta. It appears that in Sept., 1962, a settlement was arrived at in course of conciliation proceedings under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act as between the present petitioners and their workman represented by their trade unions with respect to scales of pay and other matters. The terms of settlement were incorporated in the form of a Memorandum of Settlement of which Annexure 'A' of M.J.C. 999 of 1964 is a copy. In accordance with this agreement, the employees were to be placed in the new scales of pay as fixed by the settlement and the relevant terms in this connection are as follows :

(2.) It's admitted that prior to this settlement the aforesaid respondents were employed in the scale of Rs. 25-2-55.EB.4-70 while their new scale of pay as fixed under the terms of the agreement is Rs. 32368 EB.4-104. It is further admitted that their basic pay under the old scale at the time when the fixation of new scale was to be made was Rs. 30.00 per month and as such these same was below the minimum of the new scale applicable to them which, as shown above, was Rs 32.00 p.m. In implementing the above agreement, the employers, that is, the present petitioners fixed the pay of these two respondents at Rs. 32.00 per month being the minimum in the new scale on basis of para (c) of the terms of the agreement just quoted above. The contention of these employees was, however, that para (b) of the terms quoted above, under which the employees are to get two increments in the new scales, is applicable to their ease also and, as such, their nay should be fixed at Rs. 32.00 plus Rs. 6/-, i.e Rs. 38.00 per month in the new scale from the prescribed date. On these allegations, they filed the above applications under section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act and in these applications each of them claimed a sum of Rs. 96/- as being due to them from their employers for the period Jan., 1962 to April, 1963.

(3.) The employers, that is, the present petitioners opposed the above applications both on merits and also on the ground of absence of jurisdiction of the labour Court. So far as merits are concerned, their contention was that para (b) of the terms of the agreement quoted above is not applicable to those employees whoso wages were below' the minimum of the new scales of pay applicable to them and their case is covered by para (c) under which their pays have to be fixed at the minimum of the new scales. This contention was rejected by the learned labour Court and he has come to the finding that the employees are also entitled to the benefits of the terms incorporated in para (b), referred to above, and as such they are entitled to two increments after being brought to the minimum of the new scale, So far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, it appears from the judgment of the labour Court that his jurisdiction was challenged on two grounds. Firstly, that the provisions of Sec. 33C (3) had no application to these cases as the matter involved interpretation of the terms of the Award and such interpretation can be done only when the question is referred to a labour Court or labour Tribunal by the appropriate Government under Sec. 364. of the Industrial Disputes Act. The plea of non-applicability of section 33C (2) was also based on the contention that the matter did not involve any question of computing in terms of money the benefit to which a workman was entitled. The second ground on which the jurisdiction of the labour Court was challenged was that no petition under section 33C can be entertained by any labour Court until such labour Court is specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government as provided in Section 33c (2) itself. Both these objections were over ruled by the learned labour court. The claims as made by the applicants have been allowed in accordance with the above findings and the present writ petitions arise out of this order.