RAKSHYA SINGH Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This reference has been made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge at Gaya. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate at Aurangabad by an order dated 14-9-1955, summoned the petitioners to stand their trial under Section 8 of the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955. It is alleged that the petitioners were found storing coal in village Jogia and were carrying on sale and storage without any valid authority or proper licence. On a written report submitted by the A. D. S. O. to the Sub-Divisional Magistate, Aurangabad, for prosecution under Section 8 of the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955, the petitioners were summoned to stand their trial. The learned Additional Sessions Judge recommended that the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate dated 14-9-1955, summoning the petitioners to stand their trial under Section 8 of the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955, be set aside as it was without jurisdiction.

(2.) It appears that the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946 (Act 24 of 1946) Was an Act by which the essential commodities were controlled in their supply and distribution. ' Under that Act, it appears that, there was the Bihar Coal Control Order passed controlling the supply and storage of coal. The Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 (Act 24 of 1946) expired on 26-1-1955. As this Act was to expire On that date, an Ordinance known as the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955 came into existence on 21-1-1955. The object of this Ordinance was to control production, supply, sale, storage, distribution etc. of the essential commodities. It is said that thereafter a new Act came into force, namely, Act 10 of 1955, which is the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, on 1-4-1955. It is said that this Act is precisely on the same line as Act 24 of 1946. It was submitted that on 25-6-1955 the alleged date on which the occurrence is said to have taken place, viz., 25-6-1955, the Essential Commodities Ordinance, 1955, was not in existence at all and thus there could be no prosecution under Section 8 of the said Ordinance. In my opinion, there is considerable force in this point. Mr. Shahi, however, appearing for the state, submitted that this was a technical objection inasmuch as similar provisions are to be found in Act 10 of 1955. In my opinion, even if this be a technical ground, the prosecution cannot be under the said Ordinance.

(3.) The next point taken by the learned lawyer was that there was no coal control order under the said Ordinance. It is true, it is submitted, that there was Bihar Coal Control Order under Act 24 of 1946 but the Act had expired and with it the Bihar Coal Control Order must be deemed to have expired too. In my opinion, there is some force in this submission. But even it be supposed that there is no merit in this point, the question, that has to be considered is whether the Act 10 of 1955 can govern a case like this. It was submitted in the Court below, and it is not shown to me otherwise, that there is no Bihar Coal Control Order either under the Ordinance or Act 10 of 1955. It is, therefore, necessary to see whether the said Bihar Coal Control Order can be said to be in existence in spite of the expiry of Act 24 of 1946. In my opinion, in view of the subsequent legislation, even if it be supposed that merely because Act 24 of 1946 had expired the Bihar coal Control Order did not expire on that ground, the provisions of Act 10 make it perfectly clear that the Bihar Coal Control Order under Act 24 of 1946 can have no application whatsoever. Section 16 of Act 10 of 1955 is as follows :