COLLECTOR OF MONGHYR Vs. MAHARAJA PRATAP SINGH BAHADUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In Supreme Court Appeals Nos. 52 to 61 of 1956 the petitioners have applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court in Miscellaneous Judicial Case Nos, 349 to 358 of 1955, dated 14-3-1956. In Supreme Court Appeals Nos. 73 to 77 of 1956 the petitioners pray for the grant of certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court in Miscellaneous Judicial Case Nos. 141, 142, 271, 272 and 273 of 1955, dated 20-4-1956. In Supreme Court Appeal No. 103 of 1956 the petitioners have applied for the leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the Judgment of the High Court in Miscellaneous Judicial Case No. 256 of 1955, dated 12-7-1956.

(2.) The question of law involved in these cases was one relating to the proper interpretation of Section 5A, Bihar Private Irrigation Works Act (Bihar and Orrisa Act V of 1922). The learned Judges of the Division Bench granted a writ of certiorari against the petitioner, relying upon a previous decision, Shah Qasim Ghani v. Kirti Prasad1 Sinha, 1956 Pat LR 63 (A). The contention of the learned Advocate General is that the view taken by the learned Judges is not correct and that the mat-ter requires further consideration by the Supreme Court. It was submitted that the question raised was a question of great public importance, because a number of cases under the same statute have either been disposed of or are pending In the High, Court from other districts of the State. It was argued that a proper decision of the question is necessary for the guidance of all the revenue officers and also because the question would affect the revenues of the State Government to a considerable extent. I agree with the submission of the learned Advocate General that the question at issue is a question of public importance, but the question at issue is whether the decision of the High Court is given in a "civil proceeding" within the meaning of Article 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution and whether the petitioners are entitled to grant of a certificate for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under the provisions of that article. The contention of Mr. Baldeva Sahai on behalf of the opposite parties is that the proceeding in the High Court for grant of a writ under. Art 226 of the Constitution is not a "Civil proceeding" within the meaning of Article 133 of the Constitution and the petitioner has no right of appeal to the Supreme Court under that article. In my opinion the contention of Mr. Baldeva Sahai la correct and the proceeding in the High Court! under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a "civil proceeding" for the reasons which I shall presently state.

(3.) The Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is an extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the High Court not for the purpose of declaring the civil rights of the parties but for the purpose of ensuring that the law of the land is implicitly obeyed and that the various tribunals and public authorities are kept within the limits of their jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction, a jurisdiction meant to supervise the work of the tribunals and public authorities and to see that they act within the limits of their respective jurisdiction. In a proceeding under Article 226 the High Court is not concerned with the determination of the civil rights of the parties; the only object of such a proceeding under Article 226 is to ensure that the law of the land is implicitly obeyed and that various authorities and tribunals act within the limits of their respective jurisdiction. Article 226 states that the High Court shall have power to Issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, directions, orders of writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. All these writs are known in English law as prerogative writs, the reason being that they are specially associated with the King's name. These writs were always granted for the protection of public interest and primarily by the Courts of the King's Bench. As a matter of history the Court of the King's Bench was held to be coram rege ipso and was required to perform quasi-governmental functions. The theory of the English law is that the King himself superintends the due course of justice through his own Courts preventing cases of usurpation of jurisdiction and insisting on vindication of public rights and personal freedom of his subjects. That is the theory of the English law and our Constitution-makers have borrowed the conception of prerogative writs from the English law. The interpretation of Article 226 must, therefore, be considered in the background of English law and so interpreted. It is obvious that the remedy provided under Article 226 is a remedy for the vindication of a public right.