RAM AYODHYA MISSIR Vs. RAGHUNATH MISSIR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this suit which is the subject matter of this appeal the Plaintiff asked for a declaration that the sale deed executed on 11th July, 1914, by one Mosammat Sureba Kuer in favour of Sitaram was farzi, without consideration and without legal necessity and Was not binding upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff claimed that after the death of defendant No. 1, Mosammat Parkalo Kuer, he was entitled to the properties as the next reversioner. It was alleged by the plaintiff that the widow, Mosammat Sureba Kuer, executed the sale deed in favour of Sitaram, father of defendants 2 and 3, in order to defeat the plaintiff's claim. It was further alleged that the document was farzi and collusive and no title passed to Sitaram. It was stated by the plaintiff that defendants 2 to 4 had executed a mortgage bond in respect of the properties covered by the sale deed in favour of the defendant No. 1, Mosammat Parkalo Kuer, daughter of Mosammat Sureba Kuer. The suit was contested by defendants 2 to 4 who controverted the claim of the plaintiff that he was the next reversioner. Defendants 2 to 4 also contended that the sale deed was genuine, valid and for consideration. The learned Munsif held upon a consideration of the evidence that Sheoparsan was the son of Moti Mis-sir and as such the plaintiff was the next reversioner of Ramyad, The learned Munsif also held that the sale deed in question was farzi without consideration and for no legal necessity. The Munsif accordingly granted a decree to the plaintiff. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge affirmed the findings of the learned Munsif. A second appeal was taken on behalf of the defendants to the High Court. Mr. Justice C. P. Sinha, who heard the second appeal, dismissed the appeal holding that the decree granted by the trial Court was right.

(2.) On behalf of the defendants who have presented this appeal under the Letters Patent, Counsel put forward the argument that the plaintiff has no right to institute a suit in view of the provisions of Sections 14 and 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Act XXX of 1956). Section 14 reads as follows:

(3.) It was, however, argued by Mr. Das on behalf of the respondents that there was a right vested in the plaintiff as reversioner before the passing of the statute and that vested right cannot be taken away by supervening legislation. We do not accept this argument as right. We have already referred to the language of Section 14 of Act XXX of 1056 and we have expressed the view that the section has been made deliberately retrospective and that the effect of this section is that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. It is also well established that an appellate Court is entitled to take into consideration legislative changes which has supervened since the decision under appeal has been given. That is the ratio decidendi of the judgment of the Federal Court in Lachmeshwar Prasad v. Keshwar Lal. 1940 FCR 84: (AIR 1941 FC 5) (A). It was held in that case by the Chief Justice of India that the Federal Court, as a court of Appeal, was entitled to take into consideration legislative changes Which had supervened since the decision under appeal was given and that as the Bihar Money Lenders Act, 1939 (Bihar Act VII of 1939} had in terms been made retrospective the appellants could be given the benefit of Section 7 of the Act. In the course of its judgment the Chief Justice of India cited with approval the following passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States of America in Patterson v. State of Alabama, ((1934) 294. U.S. 600, at p. 607 (B)):--