SHEOJEE LAL Vs. CHIEF CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts necessary for the decision of this case may shortly be stated as follows. Sheojee Lal, the petitioner, was appointed as an assistant in the lower division on permanent basis in the office of the Director of Public Health, Bihar, Patna on 1-1-1949. On 31-10-1952, a circular letter was issued from the office of the Chief Conservator of Forests, Bihar, to the Heads of various departments including the Director of public Health, Bihar. This circular letter was in connection with the appointment of upper division assistants in the Forest Department. The relevant portion of the circular letter (annexure A) ran as follows:--

(2.) On the 7-11-1952, the Director of Public Health, Bihar, wrote a letter to the Chief Conservator of Forests, Bihar, (Annexure B) recommending the candidature of the petitioner Sheojee Lal. On the 1-12-1952, the Chief Conservator of Forests, Bihar, wrote a letter (annexure C) to the Director of Public Health, Bihar, Patna, to the following effect:

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that from the circular letter dated 31-10-1952, issued from the office of the Chief Conservator of Forests, it was clear that suitable assistants were required for appointment as permanent incumbents and not as officiating ones. He submitted that it was on this assurance made by the Chief Conservator of Forests, Bihar, that his client had agreed to join the Forest Department. He urged that when the petitioner joined his post as an assistant in the Forest Department on 13-12-1952, he would be deemed to have joined as a permanent hand though the first year of his service in the new post was that of a probationer. He submitted that the reversion of the petitioner to his old post in the Public Health Department which carried lesser pay amounted to a reduction in rank within the meaning of the Article 311(2) of the Constitution, and as the order of reversion had been passed without giving him any reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him, such order is void, and the petitioner would be deemed to have continued in service in the Forest Department. In my opinion, there is no force in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner. It is admitted that when the petitioner joined the Forest Department on 13-12-1952, he had not passed in all the papers of the departmental upper division examination. In fact, the announcement of his having passed the remaining papers of such an examination was published in the month of May 1953. Though by the circular letter (annexure A) the post for which suitable assistants were required was held out to be a permanent one, yet by annexure C it had been made clear that the present petitioner had been selected for appointment as an officiating upper division assistant. The mention in that letter that he would be on probation for one year after passing the said examination did not, in my opinion, nullify the clear mention made in the earlier part of the letter that he had been selected for appointment as an officiating upper division assistant. I agree with the Government Pleader that the mention of probationership in that letter could not have carried an impression that the petitioner was to remain a probationer in the permanent post. Learned counsel for the opposite party has rightly argued with reference to the meaning of the term "probationer" as given in Section 41, Bihar Service Code that the present petitioner who already held a substantive post in the Department of Public Health could not have been called a probationer within the strict meaning of that term. The petitioner accepted this offer and joined his post on 13/12/1952. It may be true that when the circular letter (annexure A) was issued, it was contemplated to make a direct appointment to the post of upper division assistants, but for some reason or other when the offer of appointment was made by annexure C, it has been definitely stated that the petitioner had been selected for the post of an officiating upper division assistant. It was open to the petitioner to have got the position clarified before he joined the post on 13/12/1952 if there was any ambiguity in this offer. In my opinion, on the strength of the letter annexure C and the order of appointment annexure D, it is to be taken that the petitioner was appointed as an officiating upper division assistant with effect from 13/12/1952. In that view of the matter the order of the reversion of the petitioner to his original post in the Public Health Department did not in my option, amount to a reduction in rank, and hence that order did not contravene the provisions of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. In my view, there is no justification for quashing the orders concerned.