KARAMCHAND THAPPAR AND BROTHER Vs. LAXMI NARAYAN MISHRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) 1. That the present revision application under Section 14(8) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act is against the judgment and decree passed in Title Eviction Suit No 68 of 1995 whereby defendants-petitioners have been asked to vacate the suit premises.

(2.) THE plaintiffs-opposite parties' case was that the said suit premises was purchased by their father late Ramdhani Mishra who had acquired the same through a registered sale deed dated 05.12.1988. It was the case of the plaintiffs that the tenancy was in respect of a portion of the holding on the entire groundfloor consisting of hall, room, kitchen, bath room, verandah at a monthly rent of Rs. 500/- to the defendants-petitioners. THE tenancy being attorned, the tenants-petitioners stopped paying rent. After the death of their father, the plaintiffs wanted the groundfloor for starting their business to set up a shop for wholesale and retail sale of motor parts and in the rest, a restaurant which all they would construct on remodelling the groundfloor. Request for vacating having not been agreed to, the suit for eviction on ground of personal necessity was instituted. THE defendants filed their written statement. THEy denied having any knowledge of sale of the property. THEy denied that their earlier landlord Shyam Nandan Prasad ever informed them about the said sale. THEir case is that Shyam Nandan Prasad refused to accept rent and, as such, they instituted a proceeding under Section 19. It was admitted that the plaintiffs' father had demanded the rent but they refused to recognize him as the landlord. It was asserted that their posssession was being wrongly disturned and that the plaintiffs did not require the premises reasonably and in good faith for their personal use. THE trial Court found suit maintainable and accepted the plea and order eviction from the groundfloor.

(3.) I have examined the sale deed dated 05.12.1988. It does show that the defendnts-petitioners were tenants and the plaintiffs' father purchased the property with the tenant. This does not mean that tenancy continued all along for the entire premises. D W 1, the only witness, as examined by the defendants, has admitted that the first floor was now occupied by the plaintiffs. That being the situation, the tenancy to the extent of which was sought for personal necessity was the tenancy which was sought for eviction on the ground of personal necessity was the entire groundfloor. It is, therefore, as submitted by the opposite parties, that eviction was sought only from the groundfloor. In other words, the eviction was sought of the tenant from the entire portion in his occupatiion at the time of institution of the suit as that was the requirement of the landlord. In my opinion, the tenancy may have been for the entire premises originally. In course of time, it appears the tenancy of the first floor was surrendered because it is admitted that plaintiffs are occupying the same. What remained of the tenancy was the groundfloor and the entire was being sought to be taken in eviction. As such, even if what has been submitted by Mr Arora for the petitioners is to be accepted, the entire tenancy was being terminated and eviction consequently sought. Thus, the first ground does not warrant interference in the judgment. Secondly, it has been submitted that the plaintiffs failed to establish personal necessity. It is submitted that the plaintiffs should have pleaded the exact nature of business they intended to do, they should have specified the exact area of the premises they require. The Court was then required to judge the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the said area. This not having been done, the judgment stands vitiated. Here again, I am afraid, the submissions are not acceptable. The plaintiffs have clearly specified that the entire groundfloor of the premises is required by them. They have clearly stated that after getting it vacated, they intend to remodel the same and start wholesale, retail business in motor parts and restaurant. In my view, it is not open to any Court to dictate as to what area is sufficient for the business of plaintiffs, whether two tables, four tables or ten tables in a restaurant would be sufficient. It is for the landlord to decide the same so long as his need is reasonable and bonafide. Nothing has been brought on record by the defence to show that the claim of plaintiffs is exagerrated. Shri Arora has referred to several decisions of this Court and the Apex Court for the proposition that the Court has to find the extent of premises available for eviction and the extent of personal necessity. There is no quarrel with the said proposition but here on the facts, the plaintiffs' case is clear that the premises consisted of certain room and they require the entire for the two business ventures as mentioned. The requirement is neither unreasonable nor unreal. Accordingly, even this submission cannot be accepted.