STATE Vs. MAKSUDAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Is the constitutional right of the accused to a speedy and public trial in all criminal prosecutions now flowing from Art. 21 of our Constitution, by virtue of precedential mandate, identical in content with the express constitutional guarantee inserted by the Sixth Amendment in the American Constitution? What is the inevitable legal consequence if the accused person is denied this constitutional right? Would American precedents on the Sixth Amendment be attracted and applicable in this context in India as well? Would inordinately long and callous delays in concluding a criminal trial on a capital charge by the prosecution be per se prejudicial to the accused? These are the significant questions which have come to the fore in this reference to the Full Bench. Primarily in issue is a frontal challenge to the reasoning and ratio of the Division Bench judgment in State of Bihar v. Ramdaras Ahir, 1984 BBCJ 749.

(2.) For the determination of the pristinely legal issues aforesaid, it is unnecessary to delve deeply into the facts at this stage. Suffice it to mention that the State of Bihar has brought the Government Appeal against twenty respondents who were all brought to trial on the capital charge of murder, conspiracy, unlawful assembly and other allied and minor offences. The alleged occurrence admittedly took place more than 14 years ago on the 26th April, 1971. After a protracted investigation and trial extending beyond 5 years, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chapra, rendered an exhaustive judgment running into 120 typed pages on the 31st of August, 1976. Thereby eight of the accused persons were given the benefit of doubt and were acquitted of all charges. Further, Rabindra Singh, respondent, who was held guilty on the substantive charge of murder under S. 302 I.P.C. was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life. The remaining eleven accused persons who were charged for vicarious liability for murder were found guilty of causing simple hurts and rioting, etc. only and sentenced to various terms of Imprisonment and fine. As noticed above, the State of Bihar brought the Government Appeal under S, 378 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 against the acquittal of the accused respondents, which was dismissed in limine qua Raghubansh Singh, Bishwanand Singh and Mohan Prasad Singh, and admitted as regards others way back on 1st of Dec. 1976. However, this appeal as also the appeals preferred by the accused persons against their conviction did not reach a hearing till eight years thereafter in the month of September, 1984.

(3.) Before the Division Bench, Mr. Rash Behari Singh, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, took up a preliminary objection that the Government Appeal against acquittal qua some of the accused respondents was not maintainable in view of Division Bench judgment in Ramdaras Ahir's case (1985 Cri LJ 584) (supra) because of the grave delay of more than 14 years from the date of occurrence on the 26th of April, 1971. However, learned counsel for the appellant State challenged the correctness of the ratio in Ramdaras Ahir's case, and in view of the importance of the issue the Division Bench issued notice to the Advocate-General as well. On behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah, AIR 1981 SC 1675, Sher Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 465 and A. K. Roy v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710: 1982 Cri LJ 340. In view of the significant constitutional and legal issues involved, the Division Bench has referred the case to a larger Bench for an authoritative adjudication.