NIWAS FOGLA Vs. SINGHESHWAR SAHU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal by the decree-holder is as to whether the decree directing eviction of the respondent is a nullity and as such not executable.

(2.) The facts out of which the present appeal arises are these : The appellant instituted a title suit which was numbered as title Suit No. 36 of 1963 in the First Court of Munsif at Monghyr for eviction of the respondent under the provisions of Section 11(1)(c) & (d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), i.e., on the grounds that he reasonably and in good faith required the premises for his own occupation and that the respondent had committed a default by not having paid three month's rent. The parties entered into a compromise in the trial Court and on the 22nd of March, 1965 a joint petition was filed by them, in which the respondent agreed to vacate the premises. And as it appears from the statement of facts recorded in the judgments of the Courts below, it did not state any further fact, namely, the existence of either of the two conditions, on which the appellant had sought the eviction of the respondent. However, the trial Court, on the basis of the said petition, passed a decree on the 29th of April, 1965 for eviction and the same was put into execution in the year 1969. When an order for issue of delivery of possession was passed on the 14th of May, 1969 by the executing Court, the respondent filed a petition purported to be under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the decree itself was a nullity, inasmuch as it was passed without satisfying the mandatory requirement of Section 11 of the Act. The objection prevailed and on appeal by the appellant before the first appellate Court, the revision of the executing Court has been affirmed.

(3.) Section 11 of the Act lays down that a tenant in possession of any building shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or more of the several grounds enumerated therein. I have already said above two of those grounds on which the decree-holder had sought the eviction of the respondent. The provision contained in the Bihar Act, therefore, creates a bar for passing a decree for eviction in favour of a landlord on any other ground, except those mentioned in Section 11 of the Act itself. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that if a decree for eviction is passed without satisfying the existence of any of the conditions on which such a decree could be rested cannot be supported in law.