ARBIND KUMAR THAKUR Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this writ petition, originally filed by a retired Hon ble Judge of his Court, upon whose death his heirs have been substituted, a direction has been sought to re -fix his pension after calculating the services of ten years when he was a Member/ President of Illegal Migrant (Determination) Appellate Tribunal, Assam.

(2.) MR . Sinha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has contended that as per the terms of appointment of the original petitioner as Member -President of the said Appellate Tribunal, contained in Annexure 2, he is entitled for the same service conditions as were available while discharging the function of High Court Judge, in support of this, he referred to various paragraphs and especially paragraph 5 of the terms and conditions mentioned in Annexure 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon various decisions of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Justice Nand Lai Ganguly (Rtd.) V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., (C.M.W.R No. 18496 of 1999), of the Patna High Court in the case of Prem Shankar Sahay V/s. The Union of India & Ors., (C.W.J.C. No. 11334 of 2001) and of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India V/s. Pratibha Bonnerjea, reported in (1995)6 SCC 765.

(3.) I find substance in the submission of the learned Additional Standing Counsel. The Supreme Court in the case of Justice P. Venugopal V/s. Union of India (supra) has elaborately dealt with various provisions as well as the earlier decisions. According to the Apex Court, the provisions of law are absolutely clear and unambiguous. A High Court Judge is entitled to pensionary benefits only in terms of the said Act and not otherwise. The Apex Court held that the said Act is a self -contained code and it does not contemplate grant of pension to a retired High Court Judge for holding any other office of profit. It has further been held that clubbing of services for the purpose of computation of pension is not contemplated under the said Act and, thus, the Court by process of interpretation of statutory or constitutional provisions cannot hold so.