(1.) THESE two letters patent appeals are directed against a common judgment in two cases arising out of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), disposed of by a learned Single Judge of this Court on the 20th of July, 1966.
(2.) THE short facts relevant for the disposal of these two appeal are these. Shankar Mandal, Respondent in Letters Patent Appeal No. 22 has been awarded a sum of Rs. 1,050/ - and Jageshwar Yadav, Respondent in Letters Patent Appeal 23 has been awarded a sum of Rs. 2,450/ - by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner (hereinafter referred to as 'the Commissioner') by order dated the 20th of July, 1964. The Appellant in both these cases preferred two appeals against the aforesaid two awards before this Court. The award in favour of Sbankar Mandal was the subject matter of Miscellaneous Appeal No. 290 of 1964 giving rise to Letters Patent Appeal No. 22, and that in favour of Jageshwar Yadav was the subject matter of Miscellaneous Appeal No. 289 of 1964 giving rise to Letters Patent Appeal No. 23. The learned Single Judge did not go into the merits of the Employer's Appellant's claim regarding the validity or otherwise of the awards made by the Commissioner. Both the appeals were dismissed on a preliminary objection having been raised on behalf of the Respondents that the appeals were not maintainable, since they were not in consonance with the third proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act. The learned Single Judge held that the third proviso to Section 30(1) read with Section 8(2) of the Act Rule 9 of the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1924 made it mandatory before an appeal could be entertained under Section 30(1) by this Court that a deposit of the compensation awarded must be made in accordance with Form D appended to the Rules and the receipt for the deposit of such compensation must be in consonance with Form E. In support of the decision the learned Single Judge placed reliance upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in The Bihar Journals Ltd. v. Nityanand Singh : A.I.R. 1959 Pat 112 which has laid down that the certificate which was enjoined by the third proviso to Section 30(1) to be filed along with the memorandum of appeal must be a, certificate as contemplated by Section 8(2) of the Act read with Rule 9 of the Rules. Rule 9 in its turn has prescribed the form of deposit in Form D and the receipt for the deposit of such compensation in Form E. The Bench deciding the case of the Bihar Journals Ltd1., apart from holding that no certificate of the Commissioner was annexed with the memorandum of appeal presented to this Court, also held that the certificate which was subsequently filed in that case read with the receipt borne out by the treasury Challan which had been filed along with the memorandum of appeal could not be said to be a compliance of the mandatory provisions of the third proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act.
(3.) MR . Ali Ahmed contended that the spirit of the Act and the Rules was merely to ensure the payment of the amount of compensation awarded to the workman or to such of his legal heirs as may be entitled thereto. Keeping in view this spirit of the enactment, it was suggested that it would be rather hyper -technical to hold that even though the money had been deposited to the credit of the workman concerned in the Government treasury and a certificate of the Commissioner though not in Form E had been filed along with the memorandum of appeal, yet the appeal be held to be not maintainable merely for non -compliance with Form D and E mentioned above. I do not think there is any substance in this contention of learned Counsel, for it is well settled that under a special enactment there is no right of appeal unless given by the statute expressly. If there is no substantive right of appeal in such cases, then a right of appeal conferred by a special statutory provisions must also be cribbed and confined to the conditions and limitations imposed for the purpose of maintaining an appeal. If the statute says that a right of appeal will be subject only to the compliance by the Appellant of a technical formality, it will not be proper for the Courts of Law to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the Legislature and to hold that any such technical requirement must not be rigidly adhered to.