(1.) This is a second appeal by defendant No. 1 from the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court affirming the decision of the trial Court decreeing the suit of plaintiff respondent No. 1 for eviction of the appellant. In the appeal is involved an interesting question of law whether a second lessee who is known as a lessee of a concurrent lease during the pendency of the first lease can have a right of eviction of the first lessee on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 11 (1) of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Building Act).
(2.) Facts are elaborately stated in the judgments of the Courts below and some of them may be stated in a narrow compass here. There is a building within the meaning of the Building Act situated at New Dak Bungalow Road in the town of Patna, bearing holding No. 297/226 circle No. 6, Ward No. 2 of the Patna Municipal Corporation. There were many portions of this building. In one of the main portions respondent No. 1 was a tenant of defendant-respondents 2 and 3 in the eastern room. The appellant company has been a tenant of the western room. On the 16th of March, 1964 respondents 2 and 3, the owners of the building and the original landlords of the appellant, executed a registered deed of lease (Ext. 10), in favour of respondent No. 1 demising the entire building in its favour for a period of ten years. It may not, perhaps, be out of place to mention here that we are informed at the Bar that this lease has been further renewed. Respondent No. 1 is a registered partnership firm. By execution of exhibit 10, it became a second lessee of the premises in occupation of the appellant. In other words, there came into existence a concurrent lease in respect of the suit premises in favour of respondent No. 1, Intimation was given to the appellant both by respondent No. 1 and respondents 2 and 3 that on and from the 1st of April, 1964, from which date the concurrent lease was effective in favour of respondent No. 1, rent for the suit premises should be paid by the appellant to respondent No. 1. The appellant refused to do so. It insisted to pay rent to respondents 2 and 3 and on their refusal to accept rent it proceeded to remit it by money order to the said respondents as also proceeded to make deposits purporting to do so under Section 13 I (2) of the Building Act. Respondent No. 1 served notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the appellant--first, on the ground of requiring the premises for its bona fide personal use and, second, on the ground of the appellant's liability to be evicted for non-payment of rent as envisaged in Section 11 (1) (d) of the Building Act. The appellant failed to vacate the premises. Hence arose the necessity of institution of the suit by respondent No. 1 against the appellant, in which were impleaded the owners of the building as defendants 2 and 3 who are respondents 2 and 3 in this second appeal.
(3.) The suit was resisted by the appellant on several grounds. It was, however, decreed by the trial Court both on the ground of personal necessity of respondent No. 1 as also on the ground of the appellant being a defaulter liable to be evicted in accordance with the provisions contained in the Building Act. On appeal by the appellant, the learned Additional, Subordinate Judge has maintained the decree of the trial Court on the ground ot non-payment of rent only; he has not accepted the case of respondent No. 1 that it requires the suit premises for its bona fide personal use. Defendant No. 1 has come up in second appeal. This appeal came up for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court, but, since the point involved in it was an interesting and somewhat difficult one, he was pleased to refer this case for hearing to a Division Bench. Thus the case came before us for hearing.