SUKHDEO THAKUR Vs. J W S ATKIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application under Sections 4 and 5 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, on behalf of the petitioners against two officials of the Indian Explosives Ltd., Gomla, in the, district of Hazaribagh. The petitioners are employees in the Indian Explosives Ltd. and have been working as process workers since 1958. On the 17th of May, 1963, the State of Bihar filed a complaint against them and some others under Section 26 of the Industrial Disputes Act in the Court of the Subdivisional Officer, Hazaribagh, on the allegation that they had taken part in an illegal strike on the 11th of May 1963. After taking cognizance, the Sub-divisional Officer transferred the case to a Munsif Magistrate at that place and the case was numbered as Tr. 500 of 1963. Another complaint was also filed against them by the State under Section 27 of the Industrial Disputes Act on the same day and that was transferred to another Munsif Magistrate and registered as Tr. 470 of 1963. While these two cases were pending, a departmental enquiry was started and the petitioners were called upon to explain in writing why disciplinary action should not be taken against them for their misconduct consisting in their joining an illegal strike and wilfully absenting themselves from work and inciting the workers to join the same illegal strike. This notice was served upon them on the 28th May 1963. This was also pasted on the notice board of the Company. Dr. K.B. Mathur, Chief Chemist of the Company, who is opposite party No. 2, was appointed Enquiring Officer to investigate into the charges contained in those notices. The petitioners represented before him that any departmental enquiry would prejudice the criminal cases pending against them in the Court of the Magistrate and, therefore, the proceeding of the enquiry should foe dropped; but that was not acceded to and the Enquiring Officer examined some witnesses named in the petitions of complaint filed in the Criminal Court. The petitioners also alleged that they were being forced to disclose their defence in this departmental enquiry and the witnesses were influenced to depose against the petitioners in the enquiry also. These acts were bound to prejudice the case in the Criminal Court.

(2.) In reply, the two contenders stated that the departmental enquiry against the petitioners was started and chargeshgets were framed on the 13th and 15th of May 1963. They were served on the petitioners on those days by pasting the same on the doors of the quarters of the petitioners. Copies of those chargesheets were again sent to the petitioners on the 16th of May 1963, by registered post acknowledgment due, but as they were not accepted, again on the 28th of May 1963 postal letters were sent to them enclosing copies of those charge-sheets. The Enquiring Officer concluded taking the evidence by the 27th of June 1963, sometime before the petitioners asked for dropping the proceedings on the ground of prejudice to their criminal trial. They also denied that the petitioners were forced to disclose their defence and asserted that no person, was influenced to depose against them. They also pressed that the departmental enquiry had no concern with any of the matters raised in the criminal case.

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that any departmental enquiry during the pendency of a criminal case or for the matter of that any case in any Court of Law amounts to a contempt of Court inasmuch as it is likely to prejudice the parties and interfere with the due course of justice. This broad proposition can hardly be accepted. The employer has a legal right to hold an enquiry about his Employee with a view to finding for himself if the employee is guilty of any misconduct, by the mere institution of a case in a Court of law, all legal rights of all persons in respect of the parties are not to be automatically suspended. Exercise of such rights by itself is not illegal. It is true that if such exercise tends to interfere with the due course of justice, it has to be suspended till the disposal of a case in a Court or Tribunal. If two cases are instituted one in the Criminal Court and the other in the Civil Court, over the same cause, the proceedings in one Court will not amount to contempt of the other Court; that is, because both the Courts have proper jurisdiction to proceed with the cause before them. But in cases of dual fights like that, ordinarily proceedings in one are stayed or can be stayed at the instance of any of the parties till the other proceedings terminate. Similarly, after a case is brought to Court, any of the parties or anyone on his behalf may enquire into the Incident which is the subject-matter of the case with a view to finding out correct details and the possible witnesses and the line of their evidence. A departmental enquiry may bal more or less, of the same nature. Before any such action will amount to contempt of Court, it has to be found to be likely to interfere with the due course of justice. Contempt of Court is an offence purely sui juris and its punishment involves in most cases an exceptions interference with the liberty of another person or authority. It is, therefore, necessary to carefully examine the allegations about such an offence. In the present case the enquiry conducted by opposite party No. 2 was not made public. There is at least no allegation that any part of that proceeding was published. The petitioner did not submit any explanation in the enquiry. They did not have to disclose their defence which they can take in the criminal cases. Thus no part of the enquiry was likely to prejudice the petitioners in their trial in the criminal Court in any way, nor did it tend to interfere with or obstruct the proceedings in their trial or to influence the mind of the Magistrate. From the affidavit of the opposite party it appears that charges were framed for the purpose of departmental enquiry on the 13th and 15th of May 1963, and they were served on the petitioners on those days by causing them to be pasted on the doors of their quarters. Thus the enquiry had started earlier than the two criminal cases were instituted on the 17th of May 1963 by the State of Bihar through their Labour Officer, Hazaribagh, under Sections 26 and 27 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The employer did not start those cases.