LAWS(PAT)-1954-1-12

JYOTI NARAYAN Vs. BRIJNANDAN SINHA

Decided On January 12, 1954
JYOTI NARAYAN Appellant
V/S
BRIJNANDAN SINHA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE opposite party in this proceeding is one Mr. Brijnandban Sinha, Deputy Secretary to Political and Appointment Department, Government of Bihar, Patna, who has been asked to show cause as to why he should not be proceeded with contempt of Court. THE proceeding was started on an application being made by the petitioner, Mr. Jyoti Narayan, Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector, residing at present in, mahalla Kadamkuan, one of the quarters of the town of Patna.

(2.) THE petitioner is a member of the Bihar Judicial Civil Service, Executive Branch. It appears that the State Government received reports about serious misconduct and corrupt practices of Mr. Narayan in the discharge of his official duties while he was a Sub-divisional Officer at Auranga-bad & it was decided accordingly that an enquiry into the truth of the various charges against Mr. Narayan should he made under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act (No. 37) of 1950 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) and Mr. Anjani Kumar Saran, who was then an Additional District and Sessions Judge of Gaya and is now a District and Sessions Judge of that place, was appointed Commissioner under the Act for making the inquiry. During the pendency of that inquiry, the opposite party wrote a confidential letter to the Commissioner on 26-12-1952, being D. O. No. II/30 306/52A-11614, which runs as follows :

(3.) THUS, it appears that the Commissioners appointed under the Act have been given the power of punishing contempts and obstructions to their process as is given to civil and criminal courts by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 480, Criminal P. C., provides that when any such offence as is described in Sections 175, 178, 179, 180 and 223, Penal Code is committed in the view or presence of any Civil, Criminal or Revenue Court, the Court may cause the offender to be detained in custody and at any time before the rising of the court on the same day may, if it thinks fit, take cognizance of the offence and sentence the offender to fine not exceeding two hundred rupees, and, in default of payment, to simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, unless such fine be sooner paid. Section 228, Penal Code lays down that whosoever Intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any public servant, while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term, which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. It is, therefore, clear that if any offence coming under Section 228, Penal Code is committed in the presence of the Commissioner appointed under the Act, he is entitled to punish for contempt of himself, and, for that purpose he is undoubtedly a court. The learned Advocate-General has also conceded that the Commissioner is a court for that limited purpose. His argument, however, is that if the contempt is committed outside his presence, he is enticed to no protection under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act and he is not a court within the meaning of that Act. I am unable to agree with this contention. I cannot imagine the Legislature to have thought of providing for punishing an offender for the contempt of the Commissioner appointed under the Act if the contempt is committed in his presence and not for the contempt of that officer committed outside his presence. The Commissioners have been given the powers for summoning witnesses and for compelling the production of documents. It has also been provided that when the commission has been issued to a person having power to issue such, process in the exercise of his ordinary authority, he may also use all such, power for the purposes of the commission. The position, therefore, is clear that the Act itself contemplates that the Commissioner so appointed has and can exercise the power of a court and is, therefore, to be treated for all practical purposes as a Court. Exactly a similar point arose in -- 'S. Kapur Singh v. L. Jagat Narain', AIR 1951 Punj 49 (J), in which a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court held as follows: