(1.) Heard, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State on the question as to whether this application, being an application for anticipatory bail in relation to a case registered by the Police in the town of Chas, in the district of Dhanbad, can be entertained at Patna. By order dated 25.11.1983, a Bench of this Court, while accepting the filing of this application, has ordered that the question whether the application is entertainable at Patna or not shall be considered at the time of admission. When this case was posted for admission before me on 30.11.1983, learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for time to make himself ready on this question. Today this application has again been placed for admission, and as stated above, learned counsel representing their respective clients have been heard.
(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken me through various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the relevant provisions of the High Court at Patna (Establishment of a Permanent Bench) at Ranchi Act, 1976 (hereinafter to be referred to as the 'Act') and the authorities, particularly the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Sri Nasiruddin vs. State Transport Appellate Authority ( : AIR 1976 SC 331). Most of the provisions and the discussions in the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, in my opinion, do not concern the question in this case as to the jurisdiction of the Bench of this Court at Patna to entertain an application for anticipatory bail if it is in respect of a case arising within the jurisdiction of Ranchi Bench. However, two judgments, one of the Delhi High Court and the other of the Calcutta High Court in Pritam Singh vs. State of Punjab ( : 1980 CriLJ 1174) and B.R. Sinha and others vs. The State ( : 1982 CriLJ 61) respectively and a judgment of Muneshwari Sahay, J. (as he then was) in Cr. Misc. No. 2111 of 1977 (Nand Kishore Singh vs. State of Bihar) disposed on 16.8.1977 and another judgment of Nagendra Pd. Singh's in Cr. Misc. No. 9663 of 1983 (Rabindra Singh and another vs. State of Bihar) disposed of on 11.10.1983 appear to be relevant and I shall prefer to confine my considerations to these cases and the provisions of Sec. 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Sec. 2 of the Act creating the Ranchi Bench and the Rules framed by this Court in respect of the applications to be filed at Patna and at Ranchi.
(3.) The Act while establishing a permanent Bench of this Court at Ranchi says that the Bench at Ranchi shall exercise jurisdiction and power for the time being vested in the High Court in respect of cases arising in the districts of Hazaribagh, Giridih, Danbad, Ranchi, Palamau and Singbhum and gives discretion to the Chief Justice to order for any case or class of cases arising in any such district to be heard at Patna. In a manner of speaking, one may have a prima -facie apprehension that even an application for anticipatory bail cannot be filed before the Patna Bench of the Court if it is in respect of a case or cases arising in the districts of Hazaribagh, Giridih, Dhanbad, Ranchi, Palamau and Singhbhum. With the introduction of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, making provision for anticipatory bail, many courts found applications for anticipatory bail filed before them in connection with the cases or arising from the cases not falling within their territorial jurisdiction, but arising from the cases filed within the jurisdiction of the sister High Courts. Provisions as contained in Sec. 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were sometimes closely examined and invariably applied by such High Court in favour of the petitioners. In one such case before this Court, Muneshwari Sahay, J. (as he then was) answering a contention that this Court shall have no jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail if the case in which the petitioner is likely to be arrested is one arising within the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court, said in Cr. Misc. No. 2111 of 1977 "I am able to read any such limitation in the wordings of Sec. 438 the Code which could affect the jurisdiction of this Court to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioner. The petitioner apprehends that he is likely to be arrested on a charge having committed a cognizable offence within the jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, I see no reason why this Court cannot grant the requisite bail under Sec. 438 of the Code."