CHANDRAJOT KUER Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These 5 writ applications under Articles 226 and, 227 of the Constitution have been heard together, as common questions of law arise in all of them. They will be disposed of by this common judgment. The final hearing of the applications was postponed for four years in the hope that a matter pending before the Supreme Court in which similar question of law arises may be disposed of. Since the application before the Supreme Court is still pending, it was not considered advisble to keep these matters hanging any further, as the applications relate to Ceiling Act which should be and are disposed of in this Court without undue delay on the part of this Court. It appears that the State has taken no steps for early disposal of the matter before the Supreme Court.

(2.) In 1962 the Bihar Legislature en acted, the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Sur plus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter refer red, to as 'the Ceiling Act'). In terms thereof lands in this State were divided into six categories. Section 4 of the Act laid down the ceiling for possessing lands of particular categories. The Act was amended in 1973 by Act 1 of 1973. The salient aspect of this Amending Act was firstly that it was laid down that it would be deemed to have come into force from the 9th September, 1970. The second feature was that a .land holder was defined as a family and a family as including a person, his or her spouse and minor children. The Amending Act thirdly substituted new Section 4 whereunder lands were divided into only five categories with lower ceiling limit fixed for each category. This Amending Act brought about other changes in the original Act. We are, however, not concerned with the other amendments. The Act was further amended by Bihar Act 9 of 1973 whereunder the ceiling limits for 3rd, 4th and 5th categories were further lowered. The Act was again amended in 1976 by Act 22 of 1976. This Act provided a definition clause in terms of which the 'appointed day' meant the 9th day of September, 1970. This Amendment Act further enacted Sections 4-A and 4-B, the interpretation of which also falls for consideration in the present writ applications. Section 4-A, in short, provided, that where the ceiling area of land for any family on the appointed day has been determined by any order passed by any authority in accordance with the provisions of the Ceiling Act prior to the commencement of Ceiling Act of 1973, the ceiling area of such family would be re-determined under the Amendment Act 22 of 1976 with reference to the appointed day, namely, the 9th day of September, 1970 in accordance with the amended provisions. Section 4B was validating provision which provided that any judgment, decree or order of any court would not affect the ceiling area of any family with reference to the appointed day in any proceeding under the Act and that orders passed under the Act would, be deemed to be valid and effective. The scope of Section 4A is the main question involved in these applications. The Amendment Act 22 of 1976 also enacted Section 45-B to the parent Act which empowered the State Government or the Collector of the District authorised in this behalf to call and examine any record of any proceeding disposed of by a Collector under the Act and if it thought fit direct the case "to be reopened and disposed of afresh in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

(3.) The scope of Section 4-A came up for consideration in Nalini Ranjan Singh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1377 Pat 171) presided over by Shambhu Prasad Singh and S. K. Jha, JJ. It was held that where a proceeding was initiated under the parent Act and continued after the commencement of the Amending Act, if an order was finally passed in favour of the landholder, the initiation of a fresh proceeding would be barred by the principles of res judicaia. The same matter fell for consideration before another Division Bench of this Court in Sheobachan Giri v. State of Bihar (AIR 1977 Pat 239) presided over by S. Sarwar Ali (as he then was) and G. M. Misra, JJ. This Bench held that the determination under the Act before the amendment could not be a bar to the maintainability of a second proceeding. The same question falls for consideration once more before us. Before I pass on to a consideration of the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioners, it is necessary to set out the facts of each application.