RAM GOPAL AGRAWAL Vs. SRI SURENDRA NATH OJHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This application in revision arises out of an order dated 4.7.81 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Subordinate Judge, Muzaffarpur, in Title Appeal 135 of 1968. By the impugned order the defendant petitioner, who was the appellant before the learned Additional Subordinate Judge, was not allowed to adduce evidence in a case emanating from the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the '1947 Act'.). The case has a very chequered career. But the relevant facts are very short on the question of law and jurisdiction as urged at the Bar by Mr. Shree Nath Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner. As usual, the plaintiff opposite party filed Title Suit 127 of 1964 in the court of the 1st Munsif, Muzaffarpur, against the defendant petitioner for recovery of arrears of rent and for eviction from the house situate in mohalla Motijhil, Muzaffarpur town, bearing old municipal holding 153 corresponding to new holding 157, on two grounds -(i) that there was a, default in the payment of arrears of rent for a period of more than two months and (ii) on the ground of personal necessity. As is obvious, the suit was filed under the provisions of Sec. 11 of the 1947 Act. During the pendency of the suit, an application under Sec. 11A of the said Act was filed and the trial court passed orders to the effect that the defendant petitioner must deposit to the credit of the plaintiff landlord (opposite party) all such arrears at the admitted rate as had accrued since the date of institution of the suit till the matter was disposed of. As a necessary corollary, as was enjoined in Sec. 11A of the 1947 Act, the failure on the part of the tenant to deposit the arrears within 15 days from the date of the order and the deposit of the current rent for every month on or before the 15th day of the succeeding month entailed a forfeiture of any defence with regard to eviction to be put forth by the tenant defendant. Admittedly, there was a default and the necessary consequence followed. The defence of the petitioner with regard to eviction was struck out. Various other proceedings took place which, it is needless to mention in view of the point taken. But one point which needs to be mentioned is that in spite of the defence of the petitioner hiving been struck out, the suit was partly dismissed and partly decreed. On an appeal having been preferred by the petitioner, the appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed on the ground of non -service of notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In view of the law then in vogue as laid down by a 3 -Judge Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Niranjan Pal v/s. Chaitanyalal Ghose ( : AIR 1964 Pat 401). The matter came up in second appeal to this Court and the learned single Judge, before whom the case was placed for final hearing, also upheld the order of the lower appellate court dismissing the suit. Thereafter a letters patent appeal was preferred being Letters Patent Appeal 2 of 1975. By that time the judgment of the Supreme Court was pronounced in the case of V. Dhanapal Chettiar v/s. Yesodai Animal ( : AIR 1979 SC 1745) wherein it was held that in a suit for eviction under special/local Act, like the Act in question, there was no question of requirement of any notice under Sec. 106 of the T.P. Act being served. In that view of the settled law, the letters patent appeal filed by the plaintiff opposite party was allowed and the matter was sent back for decision in accordance with the law on the materials on record.

(2.) When the matter went back to the lower appellate court, to which court the case was remanded, the suit was decreed on the ground of default in payment of rent. The petitioner having appealed before the lower appellate court, a point was raised by the petitioner that he be permitted to cross, examine the plaintiff opposite party's witnesses. This prayer was rejected. The matter again came up for adjudication in a civil revision in this Court, this Court rejected the prayer of the petitioner for such an opportunity to be given and it was further directed that the court of appeal shall dispose of the appeal in accordance with the directions given in the judgment of the letters patent appeal mentioned above.

(3.) Thereafter the petitioner filed an application for giving him opportunity to adduce evidence on his behalf as the 1947 Act had already exhausted itself on 31st March, 1971, and there was no law engrafted in Sec. 11A of the 1947 Act nor had any subsequent law perpetuating such an action been brought on the State Book. The court below rejected the prayer on the ground that it was bound by the directions of this Court in Civil Revision 614 of 1961 in which it had been so directed, as already stated above. The court below disposed of the matter in accordance with directions of this Court in the judgment of the letters patent appeal.