YOGESHWAR PRASAD SINHA Vs. PRATAP NARAIN SINHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A rule was issued by this Court to opposite party Pratap Narain Sinha, who happens to be the Secretary of the Town Higher Secondary School, Monghyr, to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt of Court for having written a letter to Yogeshwar Prasad Sinha paying that he had filed a suit against the Committee (Managing Committee) without obtaining prior permission for the same, which amounted to insubordination and wilful disregard for authorities' decision and asking him to show cause within a week from the date of the receipt of that letter as to why his service should not be dispensed with. The rule was issued on an application made by Yogeshwar Prasad Sinha in this Court on the 1st of April, 1963, against Pratap Narain Sinha and five others, who were exempted from the rule. The contemner has showed cause and has appeared personally in Court. Before the hearing of the rule was taken up, learned counsel appearing for the contemner tendered unqualified apology on behalf of his client for acceptance of the Court, regretting the writing of the letter in issue. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, urged that the act committed by the contemner was of a gross nature and amounted to serious contempt of Court in the circumstances which he brought to our notice. He stated that the petitioner was appointed as a teacher in 1946 on a monthly salary of Rs. 60/- per month. At that time he was a graduate having a diploma-in-education and he had passed the examination in Sahitya Visharad. In 1957 he took degree of Master of Arts in Hindi. The High School was upgraded into a Higher Secondary School in 1958 in consequence of which, and in view of his additional qualification, he was placed in the scale of Rs. 150-250 by a resolution of the Managing Committee passed on the 23rd April, 1960, and the increment was to be given effect from the Ist of April of that year. This step was taken, it was submitted, in pursuance of a circular from the State Government, being No. 1990 of the 21st May, 1959. In spite of that resolution, the petitioner was not paid the increased salary and the matter was brought to the notice of the District Education Officer, who disapproved the resolution of the Managing Committee in this regard by his order passed on the 23rd of April, 1960. The petitioner took an appeal against that to the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Bhagalpur, and succeeded in getting his support for the increased scale of pay. Orders were passed by that Officer on the 12th June, 1961. The Secretary of the school (the contemner) was asked thereafter by the Sub-Divisional Education Officer to pay the petitioner his arrears of pay according to the increased scale, but no payment was actually made. The Director of Public Instructions, Bihar, was moved thereafter and the Secretary was again directed by him to pay the petitioner his legitimate dues. This was on the 18th September, 1961, yet no payment was made. The petitioner had to institute a suit for recovery of his arrear salary in accordance with the increased scale of pay of Rs. 150-250 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Monghyr, on the Small Cause Court side, on the 15th September, 1962, against the contemner and six others. The contemner himself along with others entered appearance as defendants in that suit on the 20th December, 1962. The suit is still pending. On the 6th February, 1963, a notice in the form of a letter addressed to the petitioner Y.P. Singh, Assistant Teacher, was sent under the signature of the Secretary, who is the contemner before us. The letter reads as follows:

(2.) Learned counsel urged that the sole and main purpose of the letter written by the contemner on the 6th of February, 1963, was to coerce the petitioner to withdraw or not to proceed with the suit that he had filed for recovery of his arrear salary. From the facts already stated, it appears that in spite of the orders passed by the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Bhagalpur, on the 12th June, 1961, and by the Director of Public Instructions on the 18th of September, 1961, no payment was made to the petitioner by the school towards his arrear pay according to the increased scale. The original resolution of the Managing Committee in this respect was on the 23rd April, 1960. Thus, by the time the Small Cause Court suit was filed by the petitioner on the 15th of September, 1962, there had been two years and a half delay in giving effect to the resolution of the Managing Committee. It was argued that the contemner was responsible for this delay because in spite of the resolution of the Managing Committee, he took the matter to the District Education Officer on his own initiative and wanted to set at naught the resolution about the increased scale of pay. We have no materials before us, because the correspondence between the District Education Officer and the School have not been placed by the petitioner, to hold that it was the contemner alone who wanted not to pay the increased salary to the petitioner. Whatever that may be, whether the petitioner will succeed in the Small Cause Court suit or not is a different matter but the fact that he had instituted a suit was admitted by the notice under dispute. A person has got his right to seek his remedy in a Court of Law unless he is otherwise prevented by law to do so. In the present case, prima facie, the petitioner was justified in approaching the Civil Court for the redress of his grievance in the matter of payment of his legitimate dues from the school. It was not proper, to say the least for the Secretary of the School, or, for the matter of that, for any one else to bring any pressure upon the petitioner to desist from pursuing his remedy in the Court of law or not to proceed with the suit already filed. There cannot be any doubt that the threat to terminate the service of the petitioner, as given in the notice dated the 6th of February, 1963, was connected with the filing of the suit by the petitioner. There is a reference to reprehensible conduct of the petitioner during the few months preceding the notice, in the notice itself. We do not know in what connection that reference was made but it is sufficient to say here that the notice purported to complain mainly against the filing of the suit while the new scale of pay was under the consideration of the Department and an explanation was sought from the petitioner on that account. Attempt at interrupting the usual course of a litigation in a direct or indirect manner has always been held to be a contempt of Court. It is all the more so when a litigant, who has already come to the Court, is coerced or threatened with dire consequences in case he proceeds with his litigation. Even pressure or threat to persons who may be cited as witnesses in a case conies under the purview of such contempt. Learned counsel drew our attention to the case of Pratap Singh v. Gurbaksh Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1172. There a departmental proceeding was started in accordance with a Government circular against a forester, who had instituted a civil suit for a declaration that the order passed by the Government for recovery of certain amount of money from him was void and without effect. It was held in that case that the institution of the proceedings (departmental) at a time when the suit in the Court was pending could only be to put pressure on the respondent (plaintiff) to withdraw his suit, or face the consequences of disciplinary action. That amounted to contempt of Court. There was no question whether the action in fact, namely, the departmental proceeding, did interfere or it had a tendency to interfere with the due course of justice. The action taken against the plaintiff by way of a proceeding against him could have only one tendency and that was to coerce him and force him to withdraw his suit or otherwise not press it. It was further held that if that was the clear and unmistakable tendency of the proceedings taken against the plaintiff, then the officials concerned were guilty of contempt of Court even though they were merely carrying out the instructions contained in the Government circular letter. The facts of that case are very much similar to toe case before us. In the present case the contemner has stated that the notice or the letter he wrote to the petitioner on the 6th of February, 1963, was in pursuance of a resolution of the Managing Committee passed on the 29th of January, 1963. This fact is not sought to be denied by the petitioner. But as I have already said, the purpose and effect of that letter was to coerce the petitioner not to press his claim in a Court of law which he had already commenced and as such, it cannot but be that the writer of the letter, Pratap Narain Sinha has committed contempt of Court.

(3.) It is stated, which is not denied, that on the 19th April, 1963, Pratap Narain Sinha withdrew his previous letter of the 6th February, and regretted having sent such a letter. I shall quote the whole of it.