BASUDEVANAND Vs. RAGHUBIR SARAN RASTOGI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application for a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution of India that the case fulfills the requirements of the said Article and is otherwise a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court. It is unnecessary to state the facts which are to be found in the order of this Court. For the purpose of the present application, however, it is sufficient to state that in an execution proceeding in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Hazaribagh an objection was taken that the proceedings in execution could no longer proceed in view of the provisions of Section 4(d) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. The Subordinate Judge found in favour of the objection and ordered the dropping of the execution proceedings. Against his order there was an appeal to this Court and it was held here that the provisions of Section 4 (d) of the Land Reforms Act did not stand in the way of the execution proceedings having regard to the facts and the circumstances appearing in the case. It was further held by this court that the objection that Section 4 (d) of the Land Reforms Act stood in the way of the continuance of the execution proceedings could not be raised on the ground of constructive res judicata, having regard to the order of the District Judge of Patna, dated the 6th of December 1952, declaring that the provisions of Section 4 (d) of the Land Reforms Act was not a bar to the execution, proceedings. This Court accordingly held that Raghubir Saran Rastogi, appellant, was entitled to execute the mortgage decree by attaching the amount of Rs. 83,000.00, being the compensation money paid by the Central Government for the four villages of Mahal Gaddi Masnodih, and set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge dated the 8th of December, 1952, by which he held that the execution proceedings could not proceed in view of the provisions of Section 4 (d) of the Land Reforms Act.

(2.) There can be no question that the value of the subject matter of the dispute in the court of first instance and still in dispute in the appeal is not less than Rs. 20,000.00. There can also be no question that the order of this Court in the appeal was an order of reversal. The main consideration which arises in this case is as to whether the order of this Court is a final order. In Article 133 of the Constitution, it is provided that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding if the High Court grants the requisite certificate. The order of this Court in the appeal was certainly not a decree; it certainly was a judgment and an order.

(3.) As to what is the meaning of the words "judgment" and "decree" was considered by the Federal Court in -- ' Kuppuswami Rao v. The King', AIR 1949 FC 1 (A), and the decision of the Federal Court as expressed by Kania, C. J. was in the following words: "In India, for civil suits, the words 'judgment and decree' are defined in Section 2, Civil Procedure Code, 1908. A judgment means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order passed by the Court. A decree is defined 'as the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final.' As a judgment is only the grounds for an order, it is not the order, and this distinction is maintained by omitting the word 'judgment' from Section 109, Civil Procedure Code, which deals with the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee from the High Court. In that section a right of appeal is given against the decree or final order only. The definitions given in the Code are, however, for the purposes of the Code only in our opinion, the decisions of the Courts in India show that the word 'judgment', as in England, means the determination of the rights of the parties in the matter brought before the Court."