SAMACHAR BHARTI Vs. KEDAR NATH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Samachar Bharti, a news agency, having its registered office in New Delhi, is the sole petitioner in this writ application. Shri Kedar Nath, respondent No. 1, is a working journalist within the meaning of Clause (f) of Section 2 of the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (Central Act XLV of 1955), hereinafter called the Working Journalists Act. At the relevant time he was working in the employment of the petitioner as a working journalist at Patna. He was discharged from service, whereupon he filed a complaint before the Presiding Officer of Labour Court, Patna, under Section 26 (2) of the Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 (Bihar Act 8 of 1954), hereinafter called the Bihar Act. A complaint was filed, complaining about the discharge order dated the 1st of August 1967; a copy of the complaint petition is Annexure 1 to the writ application. Respondent No. 2, said to be the General Manager of Samachar Bharti, was implead-ed as opposite party No. 1 and Samachar Bharti as opposite party No. 2 in the petition (Annexure 1). In response to the notice served on the petitioner it appeared and filed a preliminary objection that the petition was not maintainable in the Labour Court under Section 26 of the Bihar Act as also on the ground that the Labour Court at Patna had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition as the General Manager and the Samachar Bharti were residing and carrying on their business at Delhi, outside the jurisdiction of the Labour Court at Patna. A copy of the preliminary objection on behalf of the petitioner is Annexure 2 to this writ application. The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, respondent No. 3, by his order dated the 26th of July 1968, a copy of which is Annexure 3, overruled the preliminary objection and held that the remedy under the Bihar Act was available to respondent No. 1. He does not seem to have gone into the other question as to whether he had jurisdiction to entertain the application even if the remedy under the Bihar Act was available to the complainant. The petitioner has obtained a rule from this Court against the respondents to show cause why the said order of respondent No. 3 be not called up and quashed and why the proceeding pending before him under Section 26 of the Bihar Act be also not quashed.

(2.) Respondent No. 1, who hereinafter unless otherwise indicated will be referred to merely as respondent, has filed a counter-affidavit and shown cause at the time of the hearing of the application. Facts do not seem to be much in dispute. The important point which falls for our consideration in this case is whether the remedy provided under Section 26 (2) of the Bihar Act was available to respondent No. 1. If he had no right to file that application, it is plain that the proceeding before the Labour Court will have to be quashed. This contention put forward on behalf of the petitioner, for the reasons to be stated hereinafter, must succeed. I do not propose to discuss the other point urged on its behalf that even if the remedy provided under the Bihar Act is available to the respondent, the Patna Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application against the petitioner.

(3.) The Working Journalists Act was passed by the Central Legislature j after coming into force of the Bihar Act. The petitioner is a newspaper establishment within the meaning of clause (d) of Section 2, and there does not seem to be much 'debate and dispute that the respondent is a working journalist within the meaning of Clause (f). That being so, the Working Journalists Act is an Act to regulate the conditons of service of the respondent, as is apparent from the preamble of the Act. Section 5 of the said Act provides for payment of gratuity, Section 6 prescribes the hours of work, Section 7 refers to leave and Sections 8 and 9 deal with the fixation or revision of rates of wages. So providing for many matters governing the service conditions of the working journalists, the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947) have also been made applicable, with slight modifications by Sections 3 and 4 of the Working Journalists Act. It will thus be seen that the Working Journalists Act read with the Industrial Disputes Act provides a complete code to regulate the conditions of service of working journalists. It would appear from several decisions of this Court as also of the Supreme Court some of which will be alluded to hereinafter, that the legislative power either of the Centre or of the State to enact such legislations as the Working Journalists Act or the Bihar Act are to be found in one or the other item of the Concurrent List, viz, List III of the Seventh Schedule. That being so, on two grounds it may be held that the conditions of service of the respondent are exclusively governed by the Working Journalists Act and the Industrial Disputes Act, and for the redress of his grievance, if any, he has to follow the remedy provided therein. One of the grounds on which such a view may be rested is with reference to Article 2-54 of the Constitution. In matters of details the provisions may not be identical, but, broadly speaking, the Central Act as also the Bihar Act cover the same field. It would be pertinent to state here that Section 26 of the Bihar Act, as it was originally enacted, was re- pealed and substituted by a new section y an amending Act, being Bihar Act 26 of 1959 which came into force on the 25th of November 1959. This amending Act had not been reserved for the assent of the President, nor had it received his assent. Without an elaborate discussion of! the matter, to put it briefly, therefore, it would be legitimate to take the view that, if there is a complete code to govern the service conditions of the working journalists by a Central Act, the Bihar Act will give way to the former and the rights and liabilities of the newspaper establishment and the working journalists would be governed by the Working Journalists Act (incorporating many matters, as it does of the Industrial Disputes Act). The other reason, which may be given to support the view expressed above, is this. The Bihar Act, as the preamble indicates, is an Act to provide for the regulation of conditions of work and employment in shops and other establishments and for certain other purposes. I have no doubt in my mind that the news agency, like the petitioner, would be an establishment within the meaning of Sub-section (6) of Section 2 of the Bihar Act. The Bihar Act being of a general nature will cover ordinarily and generally all kinds of workers working in the establishment. Therefore, this is a general Act. The Working Journalists Act, however, is a special Act governing the service conditions of the working journalists only working in the newspaper establishment. That being so, on the principle "generalibus specialia derogant" the Special Act will exclude the application of the General Act. My reasons for saying so are these. Beading the Working Journalists Act with the Industrial Disputes Act on the one hand and the provisions of the Bihar Act on the other, it may be found that in regard to many matters there are provisions in both the Acts; e. g. hours of work for a working journalist are provided in Sec. 6 of the Central Act, while daily and weekly hours of work in establishments are provided in Section 9 of the Bihar Act. Section 7 of the Central Act deals with leave, Section 16 of the Bihar Act deals with the same subject-matter. It is not necessary to multiply instances of there being provisions in the Central Act as also in the Bihar Act on the same subject. On some matters, which are provided in the Central Act, Bihar Act is silent and vice versa. In regard to some matters the scope and the grounds on which a particular relief can be granted are different in the two Acts. Beading the Working Journalists Act with Sections 2-A and 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act it would be noticed that the order of an allegedly illegal dismissal or discharge can be attacked by raising an industrial dispute. The scope of the reference under Section 10 would be in one sense wide than the remedy provided in Section 26 of the Bihar Act and in another sense it would be narrower. It would be wider because the powers of an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of a reference made under the Industrial Disputes Act are not circumscribed by any statutory provision but are governed by the well-enunciated principles of law by judicial decisions. On the other hand, the power of the authority under Section 26 of the Bihar Act is circumscribed by the statute. It was narrower in the sense that an Industrial Tribunal had to adjudicate upon limited questions, but, it seems, in this regard the difference has been done away with by introduction of Section 11-A in the Industrial Disputes Act by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1971. The question therefore, arises that if two statutes are there to govern the service conditions of a particular type of employees, is the employee or the employer to be left in doubt as tp which Act will govern their service conditions, which remedies will be available to them and, while taking any action, what are they to do, which law are they to follow? To my mind, the questions posed by me, suggest the answers that if there is a Special Act, which is a complete code in itself to govern the service conditions of a particular type of employees, that Act must govern them although in some respects it may not be as advantageous or adequate either to the employee or to the employer as any other Act or the general Act may be.