MANAGER BOKARO COLLIERY Vs. UDAI SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) An application under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (Central Act IV of 1936) -- hereinafter referred to as the Act -- was filed on behalf of the four opposite parties of this civil revision application before the Authority under the Act to direct the petitioner employer to pay the delayed wages for the period August 14, 1956 to July 11, 1958, together with compensation, The said application was filed on the 12th of July, 1958. The opposite parties were involved in a criminal case instituted on August 7, 1958, were arrested in connection with that case and were ultimately convicted by the Criminal Court. The conviction was maintained even by the, High Court on the 24th of February, 1958 when their application in revision failed. During the pendency of the criminal case, they were suspended on the 14th of August 1956 and the suspension order continued even after the dismissal of the application in revision by the High Court. It is on that account that a claim was made on behalf of the opposite parties for payment of wages for the period aforesaid.' The Magistrate, 1st class who was the Authority under the Act, by his order dated the 12th January, 1959, held that the application was time barred and no explanation was furnished by the opposite parties for the late filing of the application and no sufficient cause was made out within the meaning of the second proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act. He further held that, in view of Clause 28 of the Standing Orders of the petitioner (colliery) even on merits, the opposite parties were not entitled to the relief sought for on behalf of them.

(2.) Against the dismissal of the application by the learned Magistrate, an appeal was preferred under Section 17 (as amended by Act 68 of 1957) of the Act before the District Judge of Hazaribagh. The learned District Judge, by his judgment 'and order dated 5-2-60, held that the claim for the period of 6 months prior to the filing of the application under Section 15(2) of the Act was not barred by limitation and that, by the admission of the application and direction for the issue of the notice to the petitioner by the Authority, the delay in filing the application in regard to the earlier period must be deemed to have been condoned within the meaning of the second proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 15. He, therefore, found that the opposite parties were entitled to get a sum of Rs. 7973/8/8 as arrears of wages for the 'entire period; and Clause 28 of the Standing Orders is no bar to their claim. The petitioner has obtained a rule from this Court against the opposite parties to show cause why the said order of the learned District Judge be not set aside.

(3.) The learned Government Advocate, who appeared on behalf of the petitioner, conceded that the claim for the period 12th of January, 1958 to 11th of July, 1958, i.e., the period of 6 months prior to the filing of the application on 12-7-58 is not barred by limitation if on merits the opposite parties are entitled to get a direction' against the petitioner for payment of arrears of wages for the said period. He, however, submitted that an ex parte order of admission of the application under Section 15 (2) of the Act did not have the effect of either holding that the application was not barred by limitation or that, if it was so, the delay in filing the application was explained on the ground of sufficient cause within the meaning of second proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 15 to the satisfaction of the Authority concerned. In support of his argument, he placed reliance on a decision of the Privy Council in Krishnasami Pandlkondar v. Ramasami Chettier, 45 Ind App 25 : (AIR 1917 PC 179). Mr. Brajkishore Prasad No. 2, learned advocate for the opposite parties, endeavoured to distinguish it with reference to the language of Section 15(2) and (3) of the Act and Rule 7 of the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937. In my opinion, the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner is correct, Section 15 (2) of the Act runs thus: