LALJI SINGH Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus and certiorari directing that the judgment and order of the Gram Panchayat being a nullity is unenforceable and further directing the Sub-divisional Officer to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him in accordance with law and pass such order or orders as may be just and proper. It appears that the petitioner was convicted for breaking a 'karha' in a village under Section 430, Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one week and to pay a fine of Rs. 15/-. and in default to undergo special rigorous imprisonment for one week by a Bench of the Gram Cutcherry Shivagarh, Police station Bikram, district Patna. This order of conviction was passed by the Gram Cutcherry on 28-4-1952. The petitioner moved the Sub-divisional Magistrate who, however, declined to intervene.

(2.) The proceeding before the Gram Cutcherry was under the provisions of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (Bihar Act 7 of 1948). It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Bench of the Gram Panchayat which convicted him was unconstitutional as one of the mem-bers of the Gram Cutcherry was a person who was disqualified to sit and try the petitioner having regard to the provisions of Section 56 of the Act. In the second place, it was contended that the provisions of Section 57 of the Act had been contravened, inasmuch as the petitioner was not given an opportunity to nominate his panch as from the panel, as he was entitled to do under Section 57. It was further contended that the trial by the Gram Cutcherry proceeded with all the bias possible against the petitioner, and the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity to defend himself. So far as the argument based upon Section 56 of the Act is concerned all that is alleged is that one of the panchas, Lalkishun Singh, had told the petitioner not to break the old 'karha'. It was said, therefore, that he was a witness to the occurrence, and such a person should not have been allowed to judge the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. While I think that it is entirely desirable that a person who has witnessed the occurrence should not himself try the persons accused of having taken part in that occurrence, it is impossible to say legally that when such a person does try a case in accordance with the provisions of law empowering him to try it, he tries the case without jurisdiction. It was next suggested that Lalkishun Singh is a resident of the same village where the 'karha' lies which is said to have been broken by the petitioner. He was, therefore, interested in the proceedings before the Gram Panchayat. There is, however, nothing to show that Lalkishun Singh's fields were irrigated by means of this 'karha' or that he had any personal interest in the 'karha'. Section 56 states that no Sarpanch or Panch shall take part in any proceedings in which he is personally interested. It is difficult indeed, on the materials before us, to say with any degree of certainty that Lalkishun Singh was personally interested in the proceedings before the Gram Panchayat. I do not think, therefore, it can be said with any justification that the constitution of the Bench of the Gram Cutcherry was in contravention of the provisions of Section 56.

(3.) As to whether the provisions of Section 57 of the Act had been contravened, an examination of the record now discloses that notice of the proceedings before the Gram Cutcherry was issued by that Court and served. Another notice issued by the Gram Cutcherry shows that the petitioner was called upon to nominate his panches from the panel. The service report shows that he declined to accept this notice. On 28-4-1952, when the proceedings were held by the Gram Cutcherry, and the petitioner was convicted, that Court certainly had a written statement of the petitioner before it, and I am not at all satisfied that the proceedings were done behind the back of the petitioner and without his knowledge. It seems to me therefore, that on the record before us, there is no satisfactory proof that the provisions of Section 57 of the Act has been contravened.